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Aim: To explore the relative attractiveness of chiropractic in Ontario, Canada from 1996-
2007. 
 
Methods: We conducted a longitudinal cohort study using administrative registration 
data from 1996-2007. Stickiness and Inflow concepts acted as proxy measures for 
relative attractiveness. Survival analysis was employed to identify practitioner groups 
more likely to leave practice.   
  
Results: Chiropractors grew from 1,955 to 4,185 from 1996-2007 in Ontario. Increases 
occurred in the proportions of female, and foreign-trained chiropractors. Stickiness 
indicators averaged changes of 0.29/year from 1997-2003, but from 2004-2007 the 
average was 8 times greater, at 2.42 points/year. Survival analysis showed that certain 
groups, like newer practitioners were at greater risk of leaving practice (HRR 1.33, 
p<0.05; CI 1.04-1.73). However, time-varying analysis showed a post-delisting, increase 
in profession-wide likelihood of leaving. 
 
Conclusion: The chiropractic profession became less attractive in synchrony with 
government policy decisions. Following delisting in 2004, the likelihood of leaving 
practice increased for most chiropractors. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Canada’s health care system, like its international counterparts, is subject to 
constant scrutiny and revision, driven mainly by three forces: supply and demand 
economics, public oversight, and moral obligation (Evans, 2003). These forces, 
perpetually superseding one another, act to reinvent health care in a manner reminiscent 
of the concept of Plutarch’s ship of Theseus: with these constantly shifting principles and 
changing health needs, what we call Canadian health care today, is very different from 
what it was over 50 years ago, when its blueprints were laid out (MacKinnon, 2013). 
Within this system, provincial policy-makers must iteratively take stock of available 
resources, and determine how to use them to provide the most efficient coverage for the 
public. Decisions made by provincial governments are influenced directly by the federal 
government and the Canada Health Transfer, which is tied to Canadian law. 
Since the enactment of the Canada Health Act, health care has been considered, 
and is intended to be, a universal, "public contract model" in Canada ("Canada Health 
Act, RSC 1985," 2012; Deber, Gamble, & Mah, 2012). Although the Canada Health Act 
provides a strong incentive for the public administration of health care, delivery of care is 
widely delegated to private providers through provincial insurance plans. These plans 
are described by Deber et al. as more of “a floor rather than a ceiling”, where a change 
in setting may also change who pays for care (Deber et al., 2012). Canadian health care 
is persistently haunted by the notion that it is unsustainable (Evans, 2003; Landry et al., 
2012; Parkin, 2016; Speer & Lee, 2016), which acts as the driver determining the types 
of coverage provincial governments will sanction. This is realized predominantly under 
provincial oversight programs, such as the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term 
Care (MOHLTC), which uses provincial insurance programs to fund health services, 
such as hospitals and physicians. The Canadian Institute of Health Information (CIHI) 
recently reported in National Health Expenditure Trends that public sector funding 
remains constant, at roughly 70% of all health expenditures (Canadian Institute of Health 
Information, 2016) with little to no change to the 70:30 public-private ratio observed by 
Deber more than a decade before (Deber, 2002). The private component of health care 
spending includes user fees for public services, private insurance, employer benefits and 
out of pocket payments for "much of pharmaceuticals, rehabilitation, dental care, [and] 
complementary and alternative medicines" (Canadian Institute of Health Information, 
 
 




2016; Deber, 2002). The Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, hereafter 
referred to as the Romanow Report, recommended that the Canada Health Act be 
modernized, as health care ought to embody more than acute care, hospitals and select 
physician services (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 
2002). Despite these recommendations, Ontario continues to operate on a model in 
which the Physician Services Committee, with equal representation from the Ontario 
Medical Association (OMA) and MOHLTC, decides which health care services will 
receive public funding. For the remaining 30% of private funding, a consumerist model 
exists where health care providers vie with one another for coverage by private insurers 
and benefits plans, as well as direct, out-of-pocket funding from the public. 
For private health services that are not funded by the public insurance model, 
public perception has the power of agency, supporting independent practitioners either 
through out of pocket payments, or subscribing to health insurance plans which include 
their services. Public agency can therefore tip the scale in favour of some services, while 
pushing others out (Kelner, Wellman, Welsh, & Boon, 2006). Deber characterized health 
care as a division between ‘need’ and ‘consumerism’, where the languages of patient 
rights and evidence-based medicine provide the context for the regulatory approach 
(Deber, 2003). This public consumerism, which Saks terms ‘user demand’, is a relatively 
new and growing movement, with the power to open doors, and challenge practices 
used to supress support for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM) (Saks, 
2015). Coulter and Willis refer to the consumerist movement in health care, along with 
the politicization of health, as a major force responsible for the rise in popularity of CAM 
(Coulter & Willis, 2004). In Canada, CAM providers largely exist outside provincial 
insurance plan coverage, creating a landscape of competing services on the health care 
periphery in each province. 
CAM professionals must work on the margins of health care, within provincial 
landscapes, acting within and amongst themselves to secure sufficient resources to 
survive. Economist Robert Evans used the Homer-Dixon, Neo-Malthusian model of 
violent conflict over renewable resources to demonstrate the health-policy-related 
conflicts experienced by high-income countries, such as Canada (Evans, 2003). In the 
public-private funding model, conflict erupts as professions on the margins of health care 
are perceived to be more successful, while groups of subsidized practitioners begin to 
feel threatened. As health policy decisions limit public funding in times of scarcity, 
professions are consequently drawn into competition for resources. Anderson described 
 
 




how a vacuum emerged as conventional medicine and the health care system moved 
towards treatment of infectious diseases and acute symptoms, and away from chronic 
illness (Anderson, 2003). Kelner et al. believe that alternative health professions have 
flourished as a result of that vacuum. They argue that non-medical health professions, 
such as chiropractic, have used social closure tactics, including professionalization and 
the creation of body of peer-reviewed research, to secure jurisdictional claims over these 
areas (Kelner et al., 2006). Relying on those tactics was necessary, since failure to 
secure either public or private resources can put the future of CAM professions at risk, 
but it has also changed the professions. In the Ontarian context, Coburn claimed that, by 
the 1990s, chiropractic had been tamed, ‘medicalized’, and had begun to rely on medical 
tenets such as the model of general diagnosis. At a time when the Regulated Health 
Professions Act had come into play, Coburn believed that chiropractic, like nursing, was 
“quite willing to pay the price of (somewhat) increased state regulation through a re-
defined College, in return for greater (implied) official recognition” (Coburn, 1993; 
"Regulated Health Professions Act," 1991). Proponents such as McGregor et al.  are 
less critical than Coburn, viewing the transformations in a more positive light. They 
suggest that chiropractic is moving away from competition with medicine, and towards 
inclusion in health care teams as spine specialists (McGregor, Puhl, Reinhart, Injeyan, & 
Soave, 2014; Nelson et al., 2005).  
Since its founder, D.D. Palmer, was born in Pickering, chiropractic has long been 
woven into the fabric of health care in Ontario, but throughout its existence, internal and 
external forces have threatened its survival. In recent history, the status quo existence of 
the chiropractic profession in North America has been challenged by market share 
encroachment of other health care professions, a divisiveness within the profession, and 
a growth in the number of practitioners despite unchanging utilization rates (Mior & 
Laporte, 2008). In addition, the McGuinty government delisted coverage of certain 
services from Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) in 2004, including chiropractic, and 
certain services offered by physiotherapists and optometrists. Delisting was justified as a 
means necessary to free up funds to address the issue of instituting federally endorsed 
primary care reform (Aggarwal, 2009; Smitherman, 2004). George Smitherman, Minister 
of Health and Long-Term Care when delisting occurred, cited the overarching goal of 
committing $600 million to an interdisciplinary team approach to primary health care. 
The Ontario Liberal plan incorporated a resurgence of the Harris government’s Family 
Health Networks, renamed Family Health Teams (FHTs) (Aggarwal, 2009; Harris et al., 
 
 




2015; Hutchison, Levesque, Strumpf, & Coyle, 2011). The plan would also establish 
regional health authorities, known as Local Health Integration Networks (Fenn, 2006). In 
the long-run, the Liberal strategy would lay the groundwork for the Ontario Action Plan 
for Health Care (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012). 
The employment of FHTs has been driven in part by the need to improve the 
supply and distribution of health care providers. Since appearing as Recommendation 
15 of the Romanow Report, the focus of those responsible for provincial health care has 
shifted to “good primary care”, which requires “interprofessional and institutional 
coordination, integrated information technology, strong leadership and governance, and 
well-directed funding” (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & 
Romanow, 2002; The Conference Board of Canada, 2014). The shift has come as the 
government attempts to curb shortages and rising fees in the traditional medical system 
(Canadian Institute of Health Information, 2014). It hinges on caring for patients by 
facilitating dialogue between an array of specialists in one place. The model proposed is 
more patient-centric, underscoring the provincial government’s effort to address 
recommendations of the 2012 Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services 
and the Ontario Health Action Plan. Recommendation 5-1 of the Drummond Report, 
states: “The system should be centred on the patient, not on the institutions and 
practitioners in the health care system” (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public 
Services, 2012; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012). This approach has been 
adopted to reduce care delivery times and divert patients with primary care health 
concerns from hospital emergency rooms to a clinical setting, where they can be more 
efficiently helped. The “Family Health Team/Community Health Centre” model has 
shown encouraging system-wide improvements in clinical care for management of 
chronic conditions without adding more strain to the health care system (Harris et al., 
2015; Hutchison et al., 2011; Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016). 
Health care has become so complex in current times that it is no longer feasible 
for a single specialist to offer patient-centred care to all patients, and expect a uniform 
result. Internationally, primary care physicians have indicated that they feel ill-equipped 
to deal with the multiple conditions that chronic illness patients present with, and there is 
special emphasis on this sentiment in Canada (Schoen et al., 2006). Schoen et al. 
proposed multidisciplinary teams, including non-physician primary care providers, to 
improve coordination of care, outcomes and efficiency. This notion was supported by 
their physician respondents (Schoen et al., 2006). Specializing in Musculoskeletal (MSK) 
 
 




complaints, chiropractors represent one such primary care provider in the Ontario health 
care system with the potential to help advance the provincial government's model. There 
is a strong link between chronic pain and conditions and CAM use (Canizares, Hogg-
Johnson, Gignac, Glazier, & Badley, 2017). It has been shown that chiropractors are 
effective treating some of health care’s costliest conditions. Although other specialized 
health care providers, such as physiotherapists and massage therapists, address MSK 
complaints, chiropractors see the largest portion of MSK patient complaints, especially 
those concerning the low back (Canizares et al., 2017; Piérard, 2012; Sweetman & 
Yang, 2013).  
The study of health care practitioners who rely mainly on private funding is of 
interest to Ontarians for two reasons. First, these services are offered in Ontario 
because the public continues to support their use (Coburn, 1993; Kelner et al., 2006). 
Second, specialists, such as chiropractors, can be recruited to work within the current 
team-based approach in health care to ply their trade in a more cost-effective, patient-
centred and efficient model, in which everyone benefits. Piérard gathered data from the 
2003 Canadian Community Health Survey, Statistics Canada and the Fraser Health 
Institute, and showed that the Canadian public consulted chiropractors more frequently 
than providers who offer similar services, such as Registered Massage Therapists, 
physiotherapists, homeopaths or acupuncturists (Piérard, 2012). Chiropractic has been 
rated the preferred alternative care for chronic pain patients nationally (Beaudet, 
Courteau, Sarret, & Vanasse, 2013). Chiropractors have historically drawn their income 
from 11% of Ontarians (Mior & Laporte, 2008), mainly from third party coverage and out 
of pocket payments.  
My study will analyze practitioner activity from 1996-2007. I have chosen this 
time frame to investigate whether there was a change in the number of practitioners 
choosing to leave the profession in Ontario following the government’s decision to delist 
chiropractic services from the provincial health plan in 2004. The McGuinty 
government’s decision to delist health services followed through on its intended purpose 
to save money for health care reform. The purpose of my study is to add to previous 
work investigating the unintended consequences experienced by targeted health 










In Canada, the health care system is based on medical need rather than on the 
ability to pay; a defining characteristic of Canadian society (Deber, 2003). Another 
defining characteristic is the persistent notion held by governments that health care is 
unsustainable. Evans believes that governments continue to cite three ‘zombies’, or 
arguments that have been killed intellectually, but will not stay buried. These are the 
interlinked claims of increased demand due to demography, technology and public 
attitudes (Evans, 2003). Despite Evans’ insistence that health care is viable, the idea of 
unsustainability persists, as evidenced by the report published by the Commission on 
the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services, chaired by Don Drummond. The report claimed 
that, since the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) will soon be tied to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth, and “health costs tend to increase more rapidly than nominal 
GDP”, “Ontario’s CHT payment could be $2.3 billion to $3.8 billion lower than under the 
current formula” (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012). While 
the commission offered a set of recommendations that could be used to contain costs, 
provincial governments have not always had open consultation processes before making 
decisions about health care. 
Changes to Ontarian health policy in the last 20 years demonstrate that at the 
crossroads of social responsibility, where health care and health economics meet, 
complications materialize regarding delivery of care to constituents, and paying for those 
costs. The provincial government cannot pay for everything, and costs for existing care 
continue to grow. Representatives of the province at MOHLTC must decide which 
services merit continued coverage, and support via public funding, (i.e. through OHIP). 
In the broader Canadian setting, health care services that do not fit the provincial and 
federal government's interpretation of "medically necessary", or "medically required" as 
per the Canada Health Act ("Canada Health Act, RSC 1985," 2012) can only thrive if the 
public or insurers are willing to pay for them. In Ontario, public pay primary health care 
services are determined through a consultation process with equal representation 
between the provincial government and the Ontario Medical Association (OMA), 
embodied in the Physician Services Committee (Flood, Tuohy, & Stabile, 2004; Minister 
of Health and Long-Term Care & Ontario Medical Association, 2013). The Physician 
Services Committee arose from an agreement struck between the provincial government 
and the OMA in 1997. Since the committee structure vests all representative power from 
 
 




the health sector in the OMA, members of other health professional groups may feel that 
their interests are underrepresented in negotiations with the province (Brosseau, Koski, 
& Johnson, 2004) and may be tempted to migrate elsewhere, despite the province's 
need for them. The Public Health Agency of Canada has suggested that some of the 
mounting costs for chronic pain could be mitigated through initiatives such as “healthy 
aging” (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2014). Healthy aging was described by the 
Healthy Aging and Wellness Group in 2006 as improving and preserving good health, 
but it is also has been described as the absence of clinical disease, “freedom from 
physical disability, plus preserved cognitive, affective and social function” (Hamer, 
Lavoie, & Bacon, 2014; Healthy Aging and Wellness Group, 2006). In order to realize 
initiatives such as these, Ontario requires a diverse health workforce, including 
professionals equipped to promote the healthy behaviours cited by the Public Health 
Agency of Canada’s report.  
According to the Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services, the 
average annual growth rate of health care costs escalated to 6.3% of Ontario’s GDP 
between 2007 and 2012. This increase in health care costs overtook the province's 
overall annual GDP growth (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 
2012), forcing the provincial government to explore methods to curb these costs without 
compromising services. One of the largest costs to health care is the treatment of MSK 
pain (Coyte, Asche, Croxford, & Chan, 1998; da Costa & Vieira, 2010; Woolf & Pfleger, 
2003). MSK pain, including arthritis, rheumatism, and back pain, has long topped the 
lists as one of the most expensive sets of disorders facing the country (D'Astolfo & 
Humphreys, 2006). In a Nanos national telephone survey about all types of chronic pain, 
lower back and upper back were the two most commonly reported areas, totalling 31.8% 
of all complaints registered (Schopflocher, Taenzer, & Jovey, 2011). Busse et al. 
reported that annual medical expenditures for low back pain in Canada are estimated to 
be between $6 and $12 billion, not including losses due to time off work and the related 
disability payments (Busse et al., 2015). The increase in costs referred to by Drummond 
mirrors the increase in prevalence of MSK-related conditions. Perruccio et al., following 
the National Health Population Survey and the Canadian Community Health Survey, 
predict that the prevalence of arthritis, which sat at roughly 13% in 2008 (Public Health 
Agency of Canada, 2014), will be experienced by 21-26% of the population by 2021 
(Perruccio, Power, & Badley, 2006).  
 
 




The need for services that treat MSK disorders will likely increase as the 
Canadian population ages. According to the World Health Organization’s Global Burden 
of Disease, MSK disorders grew from being responsible for 27.9 million disability-
adjusted life years (DALYs) in 1990 to 43.3 DALYs in 2010 for people aged 60 years and 
older, a 55.2% increase (Prince et al., 2015). Of MSK disorders, 19.1 million DALYs 
were allocated to low back pain (Prince et al., 2015) and are considered preventable by 
some, whereas others suggest conservative, invasive medicine remains ineffective in 
terms of treatment outcomes (MacKay, Canizares, Davis, & Badley, 2010). As life 
expectancy increases, further growth in this statistic is likely (Morlion, 2013; Prince et al., 
2015). 
The increase in prevalence of MSK conditions will also impact the use of health 
care services and providers. Sweetman and Yang report that during the years 1990-
2006 in Ontario, approximately 27% of the population sought out a chiropractor, with an 
average of about 10 visits per year (Sweetman & Yang, 2013). Roughly 95% of 
complaints seen by chiropractors are MSK-related (Balon & Mior, 2004). As of 2004, the 
cost for chiropractic treatment is covered primarily through insurance or out of pocket, 
and not through OHIP. Additionally, those patients with the means to do so are more 
likely to choose chiropractic care to address their MSK complaints (Beaudet et al., 2013; 
Foltz et al., 2005). Although chiropractors are well-positioned to assist the province with 
its growth in MSK-related health statistics, the profession has a long history of 
overcoming hurdles, such as lack of inclusion in the traditional Western health hierarchy 
(Coburn, 1993; Saks, 2015). 
Researchers have stated that chiropractors face barriers to widespread 
acceptance in mainstream health care (McGregor et al., 2014; Weis et al., 2016), along 
with secondary problems, such as oversupply, which in turn might affect the retention of 
practitioners in the province (Mior & Laporte, 2008). Further work is needed to clarify 
this. The literature assessing health care professional retention includes laboratory 
technologists, dietitians, respiratory therapists, nurses, physiotherapists, speech-
language pathologists and audiologists (Berta, Laporte, Deber, Baumann, & Gamble, 
2013; Gamble, 2002; Gamble, Daniels, Deber, Laporte, & Isaac, 2011; Landry et al., 
2012; Miller, 2011). There is a gap in the literature concerning retention of chiropractors 
in Ontario. This study will help address this gap by using the methodology established in 
other retention-based projects to assess the health of the profession. This will be 
achieved by looking at the number of practitioners in the province in the years 1996-
 
 




2007. The time frame studied was chosen to examine whether the decision to 
completely delist chiropractic services in 2004 coincided with a change in the probability 
that chiropractors chose to cease practice in Ontario, or move elsewhere.  
1.2. Objectives 
 
My project investigates the retention of chiropractors in the province of Ontario in 
the years 1996-2007, utilizing the administrative data collected by the College of 
Chiropractors of Ontario (CCO) on its registrants. Registration with the CCO is required 
to lawfully practice chiropractic in this province. I intend to establish normative 
registration behaviour for Ontarian chiropractors. Then, I will compare that normative 
data to the registrant decisions in the years following delisting, to determine whether 
there was any change in the proportion of chiropractors choosing to cease practice in 
the province. 
As a secondary objective, I will look at subgroups within the population of 
chiropractors based on number of years spent in practice, location, school of graduation 
and sex, to examine whether subgroups based on these characteristics were more likely 
to exhibit different behaviour than their peers. I compare the behaviour of these 
subgroups over the entire period to the years following delisting to determine whether 
any of the variables were predictive of change. 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
My study will examine whether a government policy related to health care can 
have an impact on the number of health professionals who choose to remain in practice. 
It will do so by attempting to answer the following questions:  
 
1. During the years 1996-2007, do Alameddine et al.’s descriptive proxies for the 
attractiveness of a health profession remain constant across all CCO registrants? 
2. If the proportion of chiropractors choosing to begin or stay in practice in Ontario 
changed following de-listing in 2004, were the following variables predictive of 
those changes:  
 Years in Practice  
 Location (designated by Local Health Integration Network)  










This thesis consists of five chapters, including this one. The following guide 
provides a short description of the remaining chapters: 
 
 Chapter 2 contains a literature review, applying Doern and Phidd’s theoretical 
framework of ideas, structure and process (Doern & Phidd, 1992) to the political 
climate in health care in Ontario at the turn of the millennium. It will explore cases 
of different health professions, and how provincial government decisions affected 
them as it wrestled with primary health care reform. Finally, it will bring to the 
forefront the decision made by the McGuinty government to delist chiropractic, 
optometry and physiotherapy from the provincial insurance plan in order to 
provide a context for the study of health human resources proposed by my 
thesis. 
 Chapter 3 describes the methods used to track professional activity in Ontario. It 
introduces the variables that were collected using the CCO database. It 
describes the tools that were used to measure the attractiveness of the 
chiropractic profession, as well as measures of the retention of professionals. 
The third chapter will also contain a discussion of how survival analysis was 
employed to study the variables, to investigate whether certain characteristics 
might be correlated with specific behaviours. 
 Chapter 4 will outline the results, beginning with descriptive totals by variable, 
and followed by the outcomes from the retention-based attractiveness analysis. 
Finally, the results from the survival analysis are presented. 
 Chapter 5 contains discussion of the results. The discussion begins by 
contextualizing the descriptive data, and then explores the ramifications of the 
attractiveness and retention, or ‘Stickiness’ and ‘Inflow’ results, followed by the 
survival analysis. The strengths and limitations of the study are explored, and the 








CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Literature Review Overview 
 
This chapter contains a narrative review of the literature in order to provide the 
rationale to conduct a study looking at the retention of chiropractors in Ontario from 
1996-2007. For the review, I conducted a search of PubMed, MEDLINE and the 
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health. The following search terms were used in 
combination: aged, Ontario, Canada, musculoskeletal diseases, prevalence, 
chiropractic, insurance coverage, reimbursement mechanisms, health care reform, 
health policy, interprofessional relations. The review will use Doern and Phidd’s 
theoretical framework of ideas, structure and process (Doern & Phidd, 1992) to examine 
the historical context in which the decision to delist health services in 2004 was made.  
The idea, in this context, was primary health care reform, which was a prominent 
issue in Ontarian health care between 1996-2007 and was endorsed in the final report of 
the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada in 2002 (Commission on the 
Future of Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). The Commission made it clear 
that the their proposed changes to the health care system would evolve beyond doctors 
and hospitals, which were “fine for the time” in the 1960s, but “not sufficient for the 21st 
century” (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). 
The structure, according to Flood, Tuohy and Stabile, which was mainly 
responsible for deciding which health services should receive public funding, was the 
Physician Services Committee (Flood et al., 2004). The Committee’s membership was 
divided equally between representatives from the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) 
and the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). This left little room for 
Ontario’s many other health professions to negotiate with the government in this setting. 
Flood et al. remarked that there was “little evidence of a systematic approach to the de-
listing process” and that certain health professionals were concerned about their lack of 
ability to “make input into the decision-making process” (Flood et al., 2004). 
The process, for which the McGuinty government was ultimately responsible, was 
the delisting of chiropractic, physiotherapy and optometry services, announced with its 
2004 budget in May of that year. This particular change came about as a tough decision 
that the McGuinty government deemed necessary in order to make health care more 
sustainable, and free up resources to enact reform (Smitherman, 2004). 
 
 




Doern and Phidd’s framework of ideas, structure and process adequately 
describes the political workings of primary health care reform and the decision to delist 
health services in 2004. However, in the case of delisting, what the framework does not 
encompass is the effect those changes might have had on players in the system. In the 
case of delisting, this thesis will explore a potential outcome of the McGuinty 
government’s policy decision to delist health services on one of the affected groups: 
chiropractors. 
 
Figure 2-1: Doern and Phidd's Components of the Interplay Approach (Doern & Phidd, 1992). 
2.2. The Idea 
 
One of the greatest catalysts for primary health care reform in Ontario was the 
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, established by the federal 
government in 2001 to review Medicare. The Commission’s final report noted that the 
federal share of health spending had dropped, and that provincial governments were 
shouldering more of the burden to fund the system. Recommendations from Chapters 4 
and 5 of the Commission’s report focussed on the efficiencies of integrated teams of 
health care providers and renovating primary health care (Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). Doern and Phidd refer to ideas as “the 
desired end states, the sense of public purposefulness, that individuals and groups seek 
to obtain through state action” (Doern & Phidd, 1992). The section below will elaborate 
on the pressures the Ontario provincial government felt to reform the health care system. 
It will also highlight a commonly held idea that health professionals need to work 




























2.2.1. Aging Canadians and the Need for Efficiency 
 
A significant source from which the provincial government in Ontario received 
cues for primary health care reform was Building on Values: The Future of Health Care 
in Canada, the final report of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada. 
The report used concepts, such as aging populations and sustainability, that would 
eventually be echoed in the province’s Action Plan for Health Care. The Commission’s 
Report stated that “Canada will be “greyer” in the future than it is now … [and] the 
demand for particular kinds of services will increase” (Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). Statistics Canada data clarifies that 
Canadians are indeed older: the median age of Canadians was 40 years in 2012, up 
more than 10 years since 1982, and projections indicate that seniors will make up a 
quarter of the population in 2036 (Statistics Canada, 2015). However, the rhetoric 
concerning exactly how aging populations utilize more of our universal health care 
system’s resources remains a contentious issue. Concerns for health care costs to sky-
rocket as a result of an aging population persists in Ontario, despite having been 
debunked in the past (Evans, 2003). Tanuseputro et al. studied a quarter million people 
in the province in their last year of life from 2010 to 2013. Of this cohort, 80% were over 
the age of 65, and cost the system an estimated $3 billion dollars annually, with inpatient 
care being the highest expense (Tanuseputro et al., 2015). Those costs, especially costs 
pertaining to hospitals, fall mainly to provincial governments, although the federal 
government has traditionally supplemented earmarked funds in one form or another of 
the Canada Health Transfer (CHT).  
The CHT has its complexities, and through restructuring and equalization 
payments, the amounts transferred to the provinces have fluctuated since the federal 
government dedicated a portion of the transfer directly to health spending. At times, the 
amount transferred to Ontario has dipped, causing consternation about the sustainability 
of the budget for health, which typically eats up over 40% of provincial government 
program spending (Barua, Palacios, & Emes, 2017; Commission on the Reform of 
Ontario's Public Services, 2012; Evans, 2003). A 2017 Fraser Institute report was one of 
the latest sources to voice the pervasive sentiment that health care spending, as it 
stands, is on an unsustainable trajectory (Barua et al., 2017). The paraphernalia from 
the 2012 MOHLTC Action Plan for Health Care warned that the cost of care for seniors 
“is three times higher than for the average person”, a line which was likely borrowed 
 
 




from the Romanow Report. The Action Plan also claimed that health care spending, 
unchecked, would rise to 70% of the provincial budget within 12 years (Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, 2012). Canadian Institute of Health Information data confirm the 
conclusion that Canadians aged 65 and older use more resources (Canadian Institute of 
Health Information, 2017b).  
The extent to which aging populations utilize more health care system resources 
is debatable. There is a body of North American research which looks at health care 
costs, and identifies a specific group of users as responsible, but age has little to do with 
their findings. Deber and Lam elucidated that in Canada, regardless of age or gender, a 
small proportion of the population accounts for the majority of health expenditures 
(Deber & Lam, 2009). Their conclusions are supported by other research which has 
uncovered the same, long-standing trend in the United States. Berk and Monheit looked 
at US records from 1929-1996, and consistently found that health care costs were 
concentrated among the few, and that in all years studied, the 50% of the population that 
spent the least used only about 3% of health resources (Berk & Monheit, 2001). This 
presents a fundamental flaw with the tendency to hang increased health care costs on 
an aging population. 
Projections about health care costs and aging have at times bordered on 
alarmism, and some analysts have attempted to dispel preoccupations with looming 
projections. Robert Evans, a Canadian health economist, evaluated national Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), examining health expenditures proportionate to government 
revenues. He found that as of 2002, the cost of running the Canadian system had 
remained relatively the same for over 20 years (Evans, 2003). Nonetheless, the idea that 
health care system spending levels were tenuous has shaped the political environment 
in Ontario. The focus of successive governments since the late 90’s has been to tighten 
spending and to create a leaner system (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public 
Services, 2012). Marchildon and Hutchison exemplify the continuing preoccupation with 
aging and health care costs. Although they agree with Deber and Lam’s assessment that 
a few users account for much health care spending, they contend that age must still be 
counted as a factor, along with geographical location, when considering how to distribute 
resources (Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016). From Romanow to Drummond, the call to 
reform has been tied in great part to efficiency, and a team-based approach. The 
problem was defined by Romanow’s commission as “partly about supply”, but “also 
about distribution, scope of practice, patterns of practice, and the right mix of skills 
 
 




among various health care providers”. The vision for primary health care was that it 
“provide important benefits to Canadians … and give them access to teams and 
networks of qualified health providers” (Commission on the Future of Health Care in 
Canada & Romanow, 2002). For Drummond ten years later, the call was similar: “Family 
Health Teams should become the norm for primary care … [t]hey need to be big enough 
to support a wide range of providers … [and] add more specialists to their teams” 
(Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012). 
2.2.2. The Solution: Primary Health Care Reform 
 
In 2003, the Liberals won the provincial election in Ontario, and the new 
government set to work implementing primary health care reform right away. The 
province reputedly “faced a daunting health reform agenda and a major fiscal and 
bureaucratic repositioning agenda, and both agendas were on an accelerated time table” 
(Fenn, 2006). Under the McGuinty government, MOHLTC re-envisioned a model of 
interprofessional collaboration between health care professionals. The providers were 
already present in the system, and MOHLTC proposed using a blended capitation 
remuneration model: the FHT (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 
2012; Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012). 
Some of the building blocks for the proposed system already existed as relics from the 
provincial government’s Progressive Conservative predecessors (Fenn, 2006). By 
September 2004, a Health Results Team was created to assist then Minister of Health 
and Long-Term Care, George Smitherman, who reported that 52 FHTs were in operation 
by 2005. Smitherman’s Health Results Team projected that by 2008, the number of 
FHTs would grow to 150 (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2006; Smitherman, 
2005). The administration of these teams remained a challenge, but the Ontario Liberals 
had a “new devolved organizational structure” in mind that would reduce the role of the 
Ontario government to one of “stewardship” (Fenn, 2006).  
The other brainchild attributed to Smitherman and Gail Paech of the Health 
Results Team was the Local Health Integration Network (LHIN). In 2005, the 14 newly 
minted LHINs were to be “geographically-based non-profit organizations designed to 
plan, integrate and fund local health services … within a specific geographic area” 
(Health Results Team, 2005). Fenn describes the LHINs more succinctly, as the body 
responsible for health system management. They were to collect indicators within their 
defined regions, and evaluate system performance, “including individual institutions and 
 
 




programs” (Fenn, 2006). Yet the mandate for LHINs remained obscure as far as the 
extent of their administrative power. The Commission on the Reform of Ontario’s Public 
Services, headed by Don Drummond, believed that the LHINs fell short of their potential 
in the first few years. The Drummond Report states that, “In theory, LHINs have the 
authority to allocate budgets across the various components of care; in practice, they do 
not” (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012). Despite the 
criticism, the report saw LHINs as the preferred tool to have authority and resources to 
oversee localized regions (Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 
2012), as envisioned by Romanow’s commission. They had the capability to “ensure that 
services are adapted to the needs and characteristics of the population served” 
(Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). A white paper 
by MOHLTC responded to the Drummond Report recommendations, proposing to 
enhance the mandate of the LHINs to include “primary care planning and performance 
management” (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2015). The provincial 
government in Ontario appears to be inching closer to finally realizing primary health 
care reform, despite entrenched stakeholder groups, which have resisted the idea since 
it was first introduced in the 1970s (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada 
& Romanow, 2002; Committee on Community Health Centre Project & Hastings, 1972). 
2.3. The Structure 
 
The second of Doern and Phidd’s concepts is structure, or “the main 
organizations through which and by which policy is influenced and made” (Doern & 
Phidd, 1992). At the time of the Romanow Commission, a prominent structural change 
that was called for was the implementation of integrative health teams, and the inclusion 
of all health professions (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & 
Romanow, 2002). However, the Ontario provincial government also needed resources to 
create this program, and it needed the cooperation of one of the most powerful 
stakeholders in Ontarian health care, the OMA. Flood, Tuohy and Stabile clarify that in 
Ontario, when the provincial government intends to make changes to the OHIP funding 
structure for health care services, the consultation process happens at the Physician 
Services Committee (Flood et al., 2004). The Physician Services Committee 
membership is divided equally between representatives from MOHLTC, and the OMA, 
and is chaired by a professional facilitator. This structure relies substantially on 
physicians, at the exclusion of other health professions (Flood et al., 2004).There are 26 
 
 




health professions indicated in the Regulated Health Professions Act ("Regulated Health 
Professions Act," 1991), and yet only one of those is fairly represented at the table in 
health care negotiations between the professions and the government. This structure 
has the potential to become problematic in ways that impede the progression of 
initiatives such as primary health care reform, especially on the multidisciplinary front. 
Health professional groups excluded from the consultation process have diminished 
lobbying power. Those groups without input into decision-making at the provincial level 
may more easily find themselves the targets of provincial health policy changes, and 
attacks from their peers. 
2.3.1. Structural History: Non-Physician Health Profession Targeting 
 
In Canada, negotiations between governments and health care providers take 
place under a tent habitually dominated by medical interest groups (Hutchison et al., 
2011). The Canadian structure for health care stems back to the beginning of Medicare, 
when provincial governments struck deals with physician associations. Those 
accommodations, which came into play in the 1960s, froze health care delivery practices 
in place for decades afterwards (Tuohy, 1999). The accord between physicians and 
provincial governments in Canada has been blamed for several false starts in primary 
health care reform (Hutchison et al., 2011). A consumerist movement has 
simultaneously arisen in health care, in which patients have become empowered, and 
have taken a proactive role to seek out their care (Canizares et al., 2017). Hutchison et 
al. describe how those who are better-educated commonly rely on their own agency to 
bypass the family physician referral system, and deal directly with specialists (Hutchison 
et al., 2011). Yet for many others, as Tuohy highlights, the idea of shopping for health 
care is infeasible, and the costs of error are very high. In these cases, it is necessary for 
individuals to delegate authority to a physician to manage their care. It is then up to the 
physician to act as gate-keeper, and either provide, or select a provider for those needs 
(Tuohy, 1999). The structure of the Canadian health care system therefore imparts 
power on physician interest groups which represent both those in the role of health care 
manager, as well as providers, so that ample grounds exist for conflicts of interest. The 
clout that physicians have through the health care structure has afforded them power 
both individually, through referrals (Wranik et al., 2017), and collectively through OMA 
representation on the Physician Services Committee (Flood et al., 2004). It has also 
historically given physicians a security which their non-physician counterparts do not 
 
 




enjoy. Nationally, the traditional structure has had residual, hierarchical effects on the 
way that physicians fit into interdisciplinary teams. Non-physician providers cite 
physicians’ lack of ability to relinquish control of the clinical setting as an impediment to 
collaboration (Wranik et al., 2017). 
There is a long history of interprofessional competition in health care in the 
English-speaking world, and at times it has threatened non-physician health 
professionals’ ability to practice. Saks uses the distinctions of ‘marginalized’ versus 
‘marginal’ professions to highlight inequalities in the health professions. The term 
‘marginalized professions’ refers to professional groups which have a “less well 
accepted position within orthodox ranks”, whereas ‘marginal professions’ refer to those 
professions operating “outside the legitimated state-supported division of labour” (Saks, 
2015). Both marginal and marginalized groups have been singled out in the past. For 
marginal groups, one of the most notable areas where contention has existed has been 
between traditional medicine and Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). Saks 
listed the most prominent tactics employed by elite members of the medical profession 
who have been hostile to other professions in Britain and the United States. These 
include "enforcing orthodox curricula control in medical schools, debunking the practices 
and practitioners of CAM in the medical journals, limiting access to official medical 
research funding, and instigating career blockages for those collaborating with 
unorthodox practitioners" (Saks, 2015). These tactics have also been employed in 
Canada. 
Focussing in again on the case of Ontario, Evans wrote that fluctuations in 
federal-provincial transfers from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s created pressure and a 
struggle for resources on the health care system (Evans, 2003). This struggle was 
occurring while the provincial government was revamping its efforts to implement 
primary health care reform. The conflict manifested in different ways for marginalized 
versus marginal groups. The cases of four professions - two marginalized and two 
marginal - that have been affected by health care structure in Ontario recently are 
outlined below. For marginalized professions, provincial government policy changes 
were implemented which directly affected them. The Ontario government was more 
successful at cuts aimed at professions with weaker lobbying power, and less say in the 
decision-making process. Both Harris and McGuinty governments made decisions which 
adversely affected nursing professions, resulting in long-term labour consequences. 
Pharmacists were also targeted, and when this professional group attempted to strong-
 
 




arm the provincial government to gain leverage, the Ontario Liberals were able to utilize 
public reaction to cost-cutting to the detriment of pharmacies. Marginal professions have 
also felt the effects of provincial health care policy and structure in Ontario, but in many 
cases they have been accompanied by the involvement of medical professionals, who 
appear to speak for their profession, and on behalf of the health care system. Conflicts 
between medicine and marginal professions are especially felt by providers and their 
patients (Mootz, Hansen, Breen, Killinger, & Nelson, 2006; Villanueva-Russell, 2011). 
Medical professionals who have attacked marginal professions in Ontario have 
prominently used the traditional strategies mentioned by Saks (Saks, 2015). 
2.3.1.1. The Nursing Professions: Restructuring, Primary Health Care Reform 
 
Before the modern era of Action Plans for Health Care in Ontario, one preferred 
strategy of reform was to make cuts to health care spending in areas deemed less 
essential than others. The province’s familiar tack of health care reform in the face of 
unsustainable costs, whether fiscal or political in nature, stems back at least as far as 
the Common Sense Revolution of the Harris government. During the mid-1990s the 
provincial government turned its attention to restructuring hospitals, and nursing 
professions were singled out. The regard Premier Harris had for nurses became clear 
when he infamously compared those who had full-time employment in the hospital 
industry to Hula-Hoop factory workers after the Hula-Hoop craze died down (Harris, 
1997). Nurses, who were already suffering from a labour shortage prior to the Ontario 
Conservatives coming to power, saw a threat to their job stability as hospital work-forces 
were down-sized. O’Brien-Pallas and Baumann reported a 6% drop in the supply of 
registered nurses, and an 8% drop in the supply of registered practical nurses from 1994 
to 1998. They described an atmosphere replete with layoffs, and casualization of the 
workforce. There was also a reduction in enrolment in community college programs 
which was only mildly offset by an increase in enrolment in university nursing programs 
(O'Brien-Pallas & Baumann, 2000). Shifts in the employment structure for health care in 
the province have marked it in such a way that an entire generation of nurses arguably 
never recovered. The long-term consequences are accounted for by Estabrooks in 2005: 
the fallout from the Harris government’s strategy could be measured in job satisfaction, 
turnover, ability to provide quality care, physical and psychological well-being, and 
disruptions to healthcare team relationships (Estabrooks, Midodzi, Cummings, Ricker, & 
Giovannetti, 2005). It is debatable how much of the $1.1 billion in savings identified by 
 
 




the Health Services Restructuring Commission was actually realized, since the intent 
was to reinvest recovered funds into other health care services (The Ontario Health 
Services Restructuring Commission, 2000). The effects of nurse fatigue and burnout 
have been well-studied, and have been linked with errors or near errors on the job, 
implying further costs to health care felt by the workforce and patients (Canadian Nurses 
Association & Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, 2010). 
The McGuinty government, despite campaign promises, continued to contribute 
to the provincial government’s poor track record with nurses in its first term. One of the 
Ontario Liberals’ most popular election campaign promises in 2003 was their plan to hire 
on 8,000 more nurses (Mackie, 2003; Mackie & Galloway, 2003). In mid-January of 
2005, tensions rose again as Minister Smitherman announced that up to 757 full time 
equivalent positions for nurses in hospitals would be cut to help the hospitals balance 
their budgets. Irmajean Bajnok, Acting Director of the Registered Nurses Association of 
Ontario, expressed the sentiment that sanctioning of nurse layoffs would “send nurses 
packing, either to other jurisdictions or to other professions”. She also pointed to the 
effect it would likely have on students considering nursing, as well as employment 
prospects for new graduates (MacKinnon, 2005). At Queen’s Park, Linda Haslam-
Stroud, then president of the Ontario Nursing Association, was quoted as saying that 
nurses felt “betrayed by the government”. The nursing positions lost would likely include 
those “who provide psychiatric care, work in the emergency department, in obstetrical 
care and in cardiac care” – they were not administrative positions (Martel, 2005). 
Alameddine et al. showed that from 1993-2006, overall growth in College of Nurses of 
Ontario registrants, including active registrants, was flat, despite a population increase of 
18% in the province, or nearly two million people (Alameddine, Baumann, Onate, & 
Deber, 2011; Newfoundland & Labrador Statistics Agency, 2017). There are two telling 
statistics from the Alameddine et al. paper which echo Bajnok’s statements. The first is 
that the data show that nurses who relocated out of province were resistant to returning 
to work in Ontario, despite maintaining their registrations. The second is that in 2003, the 
number of nurses registered to practice in Ontario who were neither working nor seeking 
nursing work shot up over 1,000, and stayed relatively high through the year 2006 
(Alameddine et al., 2011). Provincial policy changes have had proven consequences on 
labour for nurses in the past, but for other singled out health professions, such as 








2.3.1.2. Pharmacists: Transparency, and the Drug Benefits Plan 
 
Pharmacists make up another health professional group under Saks’ 
marginalized category that has been affected by provincial decision-making since the 
Ontario government began instituting primary health care reform. The labour distribution 
of pharmacists is unlike that of nurses. The Canadian Pharmacists Association reports 
that 70% of pharmacists work in community pharmacies, 15% work in hospitals, and the 
remaining 15% work in industry, the government, associations, or colleges and 
universities (Canadian Pharmacists Association, 2018). A prominent attribute which 
distinguishes pharmacists from nurses in terms of labour is the model by which they 
practice. Pharmacist welfare is often tied to pharmacies, making it difficult to determine 
the extent to which policy changes affect them. Evans commented that so long as there 
is a “steady up-trend in prescriptions to be filled … pharmacists will be needed to fill 
them” (Evans, 2010). Pharmacists and pharmacies can be affected by policy change, 
though, and these effects are tied to national and international markets.  
Another of the Ontario provincial government’s strategies to contain spending in 
health care focussed on public money spent on drugs, and pharmacists were embroiled 
in the resulting policy changes. The Transparent Drug System for Patients Act, or Bill 
102, was adopted in 2006, and established that the Ontario provincial government would 
pay 50% of brand-name drug prices for their generic drug equivalents ("Transparent 
Drug System for Patients Act," 2006). The Act was passed at a time when it had become 
clear that Canadians paid some of the highest prices for generic drugs in the world. The 
system was blamed for the price inflation: it allowed drug manufacturers to offer product 
rebates to pharmacies, who could then bill those drugs back to the province at the prices 
on the provincial drug formulary for greater profit. The provincial government curbed the 
rebates with the Act, but continued to allow manufacturer-pharmacy kickbacks of up to 
20% for “professional allowances” (Silversides, 2009). The office of Deputy Minister of 
Health, Helen Stevenson, cited $683 million in savings in the first two years following the 
Act. It also claimed to have curbed inflation of drug prices from 10% to 5% (Scott, 2010). 
However, in 2008, drug manufacturers reported having paid out $680 million in 
professional allowances to pharmacies, an amount similar to that which they paid for 
pharmacy rebates in 2006 (Silversides, 2009). This gave every indication that despite 
the measures taken, nothing had really changed with respect to the relationship between 
pharmacies and drug manufacturers. Additionally, allegations arose in the years 
 
 




following Bill 102 that secretive deals were taking place between provincial government 
representatives and drug manufacturers. These deals concerned whether the 
manufacturers’ products would be covered on the Ontario Drug Benefit formulary 
(Picard, 2010). In 2010, Stevenson quietly resigned from office following freedom-of-
information requests from the Information and Privacy Commissioner. The requests 
uncovered inequitable pricing practices of brand name drug companies in favour of 
Ontario, raising the ire of other provinces (Radwanski, 2010a). The provincial 
government responded that year by cracking down on deals between drug 
manufacturers and pharmacies (Evans, 2010; Radwanski, 2010b). These exchanges 
between the provincial government and pharmacies would play out on the stock market 
rather than in the labour force. 
The Ontario Liberals’ aim for Bill 102, and the 2010 correction, was to curb 
generic drug prices. While pharmacists appear to have weathered the changes well, 
there were unintended, economic consequences for the province. The effect of Bill 102 
and the 2010 policy decisions on the number of pharmacists and pharmacies in Ontario 
has not been studied extensively in the scientific literature as there were no labour force 
disruptions to speak of. The Ontario College of Pharmacists began to publicly track 
pharmacies in the province by the following types in 2010: independently owned, chains, 
and pharmacies operating under a banner or franchise (Ontario College of Pharmacists, 
2010). Accounting for a classification change for pharmacies implemented in the 
college’s 2011 annual report, the proportion of pharmacies by type appears to have 
stayed consistent, and pharmacy numbers have steadily been growing for the past 5 
years. The number of pharmacists in the province also appears to have been growing at 
an average annual rate of 4% since 2007. However, Evans noticed a more immediate 
change in the stock market. Shares in Shoppers Drug Mart, one of the largest pharmacy 
chains in the province, dropped 16% overnight in April, 2010, with its market value 
bottoming out a further 10 points lower in June, to three-quarters what it was worth 
earlier in the year (Evans, 2010). In retaliation, Shoppers Drug Mart pointedly cut store 
hours in Health Minister Deb Matthews’ home town. This both served to shift attention 
away from independent pharmacy owners, as well as weakening the resolve of the 
political opposition to speak out on behalf of pharmacists (Radwanski, 2010b, 2010c). It 
has been speculated that independent pharmacy owners took the greater hit in these 
exchanges with the provincial government, but this hit likely affected store profits rather 
than individual salaries (Evans, 2010).  
 
 




The formation of the Independent Pharmacists Association of Ontario supports 
the notion that organized resistance had formed to Bill 102, although there has been little 
activity on the association’s web site since 2010 (Donovan Consulting Group, 2007; 
Independent Pharmacists Association of Ontario, 2008). Most likely, however, the costs 
of the policy changes were originally absorbed by pharmacies, and then transferred to 
more vulnerable Ontarians. Examples of those who eventually shouldered the cost 
include those no longer covered by employer drug plans (Silversides, 2009), lower 
income individuals who often fail to fill prescriptions (Lexchin, 2015), and recipients of 
dispensing services through seniors’ homes (Welsh, 2016).  
2.3.1.3. Homeopathy: Legitimacy through Regulatory Establishment 
 
Marginal professions, like homeopaths, are less often targeted by provincial 
policy changes, since they rely on out-of-pocket or third party payments, limiting the 
number of policy levers the provincial government may employ. Instead, an overarching 
concern for this profession in recent times has been the pursuit of legitimization through 
the establishment of a regulatory college. Homeopaths have only been counted among 
regulated health professionals in Ontario since 2015, with the proclamation of the 
Homeopathy Act, 2007. The College of Homeopaths of Ontario offers little comparative 
information on its registrants at this time, save that it issued certificates of registration to 
486 homeopaths in 2017, nearly double the amount of certificates issued in its first year 
in 2016 (College of Homeopaths of Ontario, 2017). Kelner et al. reported that 
homeopathy might have been widely used in other parts of the world, but in Canada, it 
was only beginning to experience a small revival by 2006, with about 2% of the 
population visiting a practitioner (Kelner et al., 2006). Canizares et al. used the National 
Population Health Survey in 2010 to set utilization rates at about 3%, although the 
survey question concerning homeopathy use was worded so as to include naturopaths 
as well. The researchers also showed that naturopaths and homeopaths were becoming 
more popular with Baby Boomers and Generation X over time, with utilization rates 
climbing by almost 50% over 15 years (Canizares et al., 2017). The addition of 
homeopaths to the Regulated Health Professions Act stirred up another type of targeting 
which differs from that experienced by nurses and pharmacists, but one which is more 
familiar to other marginal professions. It entails the involvement of other health 
professionals, rather than direct confrontation with provincial governments. 
 
 




The official establishment of the College of Homeopaths of Ontario in April of 
2015 spurred a reaction from some in the medical profession which Saks might call a 
classical response (Saks, 2015). Dr. David Juurlink, a decorated scholar at the 
Sunnybrook Research Institute, went on record at the time, stating, "the idea that we 
have a College of Homeopaths, really is an embarrassment. We don't have a College of 
Wizards or a College of Astrologers for good reason" (Brown, 2015). Others speculated 
that including homeopaths under the regulatory umbrella was advantageous; Dr. 
Matthew Stanbrook, a respirologist, and Deputy Editor at the Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, was quick to point out the potential benefits of having the college, 
including enforced accountability, and the threat of professional misconduct for those 
registrants who fail to seek out appropriate care for patients with medical conditions 
(Brown, 2015). The controversy regarding homeopathy spilled over into academic 
research at the Leslie Dan Faculty of Pharmacy at the University of Toronto. Dr. Heather 
Boon, the Dean at Leslie Dan, was conducting a clinical trial to understand why patients 
so strongly supported homeopathic treatment of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. 
She was attacked on air and in the press by Dr. Joe Schwarcz of McGill's Office of 
Science for Integrity, who had circulated a petition among 90 scientists who allegedly 
questioned Dr. Boon's study. Dr. Schwarcz, who was given a chance on national radio to 
hear from Dr. Boon directly about her study, publicly denounced it as a waste of money, 
despite his earlier statement that he was not challenging Dr. Boon’s academic freedom. 
He further stated that involving an institution with a reputation such as the University of 
Toronto, and an investigator of Dr. Boon’s stature, gave homeopathy a level of 
legitimacy it did not deserve (Tremonti, 2015). The media also seemed to have a stake 
in the debate over whether the college should be granted regulatory status, with one 
headline reading “We’re aiding and abetting homeopathic quackery” (Picard, 2015). This 
attack style appears in an earlier example in Ontario involving chiropractic, where there 
was another unified attempt by professionals and the media to rally against public 
acceptance of a marginal health care profession. 
2.3.1.4. Chiropractors: Spinal Manipulation, Stroke and OHIP Delisting 
 
Another example of interprofessional attacks on a health profession can be seen 
in the case of chiropractors in the early 2000s. Chiropractic, though more established in 
Ontario, still fits under Saks’ categorization as a marginal health profession (Saks, 
 
 




2015). Chiropractors have at times enjoyed partial coverage for their services under 
OHIP. Included among regulated professions since the Regulated Professions Act and 
Chiropractic Act were passed in 1991, the College of Chiropractors of Ontario reported 
4,311 active members in December, 2016 ("Chiropractic Act," 1991; College of 
Chiropractors of Ontario, 2016; "Regulated Health Professions Act," 1991). Kelner et al., 
when comparing chiropractors to homeopaths, noted that the Canadian chiropractic 
training program was rigorous, containing elements of medical science in its curriculum 
in a bid to increase professional legitimacy (Kelner et al., 2006). For Welsh et al., that 
legitimacy reputedly came at the cost of a narrower scope of practice (Welsh, Kelner, 
Wellman, & Boon, 2004). Despite successful attempts by the chiropractic community to 
gain mainstream acceptance, it was targeted by medical professionals on both academic 
and public fronts at the turn of the millennium. One procedure offered by chiropractors 
came under particular scrutiny by neurologists: adjustment of the neck, or cervical 
manipulation, as it is commonly referred to in the literature. At the Canadian Stroke 
Consortium in 2000, Norris et al. presented cases which they claimed provided evidence 
of a causal relation between cervical manipulation and stroke. In 2002 Beletsky 
presented the same message at the American Stroke Association’s 27th International 
Stroke Conference in San Antonio (Beletsky, 2002; Norris & Beletsky, 2001; Norris, 
Beletsky, & Nadareishvili, 2000). The group’s attacks on chiropractic happened in 
concert with another effort in Ontario led by Dr. Murray Katz. Katz, who had trained as a 
pediatrician, styled himself a Medical Legal Expert operating out of McGill University in 
Montreal, Quebec (Coren, 2000). He took his crusade to the public at the inquest into 
the death of Lana Dale Lewis, where it was to be determined whether chiropractic care 
she had received before her death had contributed to her fatal stroke. Katz was 
eventually dismissed from the Lewis Inquest when it was revealed that he had 
unethically coerced an official of the Coroner's Office to re-open Ms. Lewis' case 
(Abbate, 2001). Norris’ and Beletsky’s basis for the association between chiropractic 
care and stroke was challenged, and the incidence of cases where cervical manipulation 
resulted in stroke was disputed (Haldeman, Carey, Townsend, & Papadopoulos, 2001; 
Kapral & Bondy, 2001; Rothwell, Bondy, & Williams, 2001). Despite this, erroneous 
claims about incidence and attempts to establish causality persisted (Ernst & Canter, 
2006; Leon-Sanchez, Cuetter, & Ferrer, 2007; Smith et al., 2003). These accusations 
would have the potential to impact the chiropractic profession for many years before 
 
 




strong, well-designed studies appeared in the scientific literature examining stroke and 
cervical manipulation. 
Clarification regarding chiropractic care and strokes would eventually be 
published in the scientific literature, but not before the initial, negative claims could take 
hold and permeate in Ontario. An exhaustive analysis (109 million person-years over a 
9-year period) was published by Cassidy et al. in 2009. The team investigated whether a 
causal link existed between chiropractic care and stroke following the dissection of the 
vertebrobasilar artery (VBA). The paper concluded that patients already experiencing 
symptoms of a VBA dissection were more likely to seek a chiropractor, and this was 
responsible for the association observed by Norris. This association was not causal; it 
was in fact uniform across all primary care providers, suggesting that a patient was no 
more likely to experience a stroke after a visit to a chiropractor than to a physician 
(Cassidy et al., 2009; Choi, Boyle, Cote, & Cassidy, 2011). The Cassidy et al. paper may 
have helped to redeem the perception of chiropractic treatment, but the criticisms 
levelled at the profession had ample time to cause damage to its reputation in Ontario. In 
2002, the media had also picked up on interprofessional tensions between chiropractors 
and their fellow health care professionals. The front page of one Toronto newspaper 
featured a headline reading "MDs Warn of Chiropractic Peril"; citing literature which 
launched inaccurate accusations, such as that “neck manipulations … [trigger] as many 
as 200 strokes a year” (Evenson, 2002). At a time when the government was searching 
for services to cut from provincial health, this attention did not bode well for the 
chiropractic profession. 
Chiropractors would deal not only with interprofessional conflict at the turn of the 
millennium, but it would also face the systemic costs of primary health care reform in 
Ontario. The McGuinty Liberals announced in their 2004 budget that they would be 
delisting chiropractic services, among others, from OHIP. Whether interprofessional 
relations and media coverage for chiropractic at this time was an influential factor, or 
merely coincidental, the decision to completely delist the services of chiropractors was 
carried out as planned. Coverage for physiotherapy and optometry under OHIP was also 
targeted in the delisting decision. In the case of physiotherapy, the provincial 
government had proposed to fully delist services in the 2004 budget, but switched its 
decision to partial delisting days before the enactment (Landry et al., 2006). Delisting 
health services from OHIP in 2004 had implications for patients seeking care for chronic 
conditions, especially lower income Ontarians. In 2006, Landry et al. published a study 
 
 




which followed a cohort of physiotherapy patients from pre- to post-delisting, and 
concluded that 17.7% of physiotherapy patients discontinued treatment because they 
were unable to access private insurance or pay out-of-pocket (Landry et al., 2006). They 
suspected that, since physiotherapy was only partially delisted, and nearly half of their 
sample was still eligible for public coverage, the effect would have been much greater 
had full delisting been implemented as originally planned by the McGuinty government. 
Similarily, Jin et al. analyzed optometry in the Canadian Community Health Survey 
results pre- and post-delisting, and found a threefold increase over time in the disparity 
between Ontarians with the highest and lowest incomes utilizing eye care services (Jin, 
Buys, Hatch, & Trope, 2012). The authors concluded that delisting contradicted the 
Health Canada objective to reduce health care inequalities. While the provincial 
government may have saved funds in terms of budget line items with its decision, 
another result was a transfer of costs to groups who could not afford them. This is also 
supported in research on chiropractic services and delisting. Sweetman and Yang report 
that of the 23% reduction in chiropractic utilization they observed in national survey data 
following delisting, the detrimental effects of the policy change were felt mostly among 
middle and low income households, with a greater emphasis on the latter group 
(Sweetman & Yang, 2013). 
2.4. The Process 
 
The delisting of health services announced in the 2004 Ontario provincial budget 
exemplifies the third of Doern and Phidd’s concepts: process. Process is defined as, “the 
regularized rhythms relationships and behaviour flowing from … policy- and decision-
making activity” such as “spending, taxation and regulation” (Doern & Phidd, 1992). The 
McGuinty government referred to delisting as a tough decision, but one which allowed 
them to make the health care system more sustainable (Smitherman, 2004). Whether 
the decision to delist truly resulted in cost-savings to Ontarian health care is unclear. 
However, the setting in which delisting was implemented provides a unique opportunity 
to study the professions affected by these changes. Each of the three targeted 
professions had a regulatory body which was tracking the number of professionals who 
were permitted to practice in the province at the time the decision to delist services was 
made. The McGuinty Liberals began their first term with a service cut which was very 
similar to measures undertaken by their Conservative predecessors. Delisting targeted 
services which all addressed chronic types of health complaints, and coincidentally, one 
 
 




of the initiatives that became focal during primary health care reform in Ontario was how 
the system dealt with chronic illness. The rollout of new initiatives intended to address 
chronic complaints in the health care system may have mitigated the extent to which the 
provincial government felt backlash for its changes.   
2.4.1. Framing Delisting: Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures 
 
Liberal provincial governments in Ontario over the last 15 years have utilized 
popular sentiment, often speaking directly to Ontarians through media releases, to push 
tough decisions through parliament. The tactic of appealing to the public is described by 
Béland as favouring “communicative discourse” over “coordinative discourse” – the latter 
describing instances where politicians work with industry partners instead (Béland, 
2009). From 2003-05, the newly elected McGuinty government required a vehicle to 
create the change that it promised its constituents on the campaign trail, and the order of 
the day was that desperate times called for desperate measures. Marmor et al. discuss 
how, when the public witnesses economic strain, for example through "persistent 
stagflation", it can erode support for certain programs that are otherwise "sacrosanct", 
creating an incentive “to explore transformative but not fiscally burdensome options” 
(Marmor, Freeman, & Okma, 2005). The authors of the Romanow Report argued that 
the Canadian health care system was as sustainable as Canadians wanted it to be, and 
that governments were tasked with deciding how and where to invest funds  
(Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & Romanow, 2002). In this 
context, Minister Smitherman’s argument to push ahead with delisting might have kept 
its traction despite public confrontation, because of the invocation of primary health care 
reform - a prominent issue in the provincial election of 2003 (Aggarwal, 2009; Haydt, 
2014). The resistance that mounted against the decision to delist can be found in 
Hansard coverage of Queen’s Park. An indicator of the magnitude of this resistance is 
evident in the fact that it was not only the political opposition voicing concern, but instead 
dissent arose from representatives from all political parties, as well as popular 
advocates. 
2.4.2. Delisting and Public Opinion 
 
When the McGuinty government delisted chiropractic care, and coverage for 
much of physiotherapist services and eye exams from OHIP, the decision was met with 
 
 




considerable resistance from the public. In the case of chiropractic, Members of 
Provincial Parliament (MPP) brought 165 petitions from their constituents opposed to the 
cut from mid-May, when the intention to delist was announced, to December 1, 2004. Of 
the 103 seats in parliament at the time, petitions were brought forward by 51 MPPs, 
including 21 Liberal party members. The opposition attacked Liberal party cohesion, 
pointing out that the resolve of some backbenchers was faltering due to pressure from 
their ridings (O'Toole, 2004). Frank Klees, the Progressive Conservative MPP for Oak 
Ridges, accused Liberal MPPs Ernie Parsons and Kim Craitor of going on record in the 
media (on radio and in the press) to question delisting, and promising to fight it (Klees, 
2004). The effects of the decision were felt on the political scale as well; Premier 
McGuinty received a letter from Réginald Bélair of the Federal Liberal government 
suggesting that delisting, among other decisions, was hurting their chances of winning 
the federal election that year (Martel, 2004). On June 17, a demonstration against 
delisting took place outside of Queen’s Park, with Olympic medallist, Curt Harnett, acting 
as a spokesperson, (Witmer, 2004a). Mr. Harnett’s message was that delisting would 
cost the government more than it would save from the cuts, since the public would be 
going to general practitioners to seek alternative care. Despite the resistance, the 
Ontario Liberals pushed through with delisting optometry and chiropractic as originally 
planned, and partial delisting of physiotherapy services. 
2.4.3. How the McGuinty Government Succeeded 
 
The arguments against delisting had been mounted, and party support appeared 
to be wavering, and yet the Ontario Liberals persisted with delisting optometry and 
chiropractic services on schedule in late 2004. Béland states that ideas are sometimes 
“powerful ideological weapons” that can form a public discourse. If that discourse is 
framed correctly, it can convince stakeholders that change is necessary through the 
“social construction of the need to reform” (Béland, 2009). This appears to have been 
the recipe for the McGuinty government’s success. In addition, the introduction of new 
initiatives to combat chronic health conditions, that would form the foundation of how the 
health care system would address chronic health care in the province, might also have 
helped to distract the public eye. One of these initiatives was the creation of the Ministry 
of Health Promotion, which was tasked with creating a healthier province through such 
preventive measures as “nutritious eating and appropriate physical activity” (Ministry of 
Health Promotion, 2006). Over the next five years, the Ministry of Health Promotion 
 
 




eventually morphed into the Ministry of Health Promotion and Sport, and was finally 
merged with MOHLTC. Although short-lived, the Ministry of Health Promotion and Sport 
served as a vehicle to reinvigorate the public health system, and it helped support 
another newly launched initiative: Operation Health Protection. Operation Health 
Protection was announced in 2004, and although its primary focus was infectious 
diseases, its bestowal of new, arm’s length reporting powers on the Chief Medical 
Officer of Health allowed Dr. Sheela Basrur to broaden the scope of her office to include 
chronic diseases (Basrur, 2005). This was formative for the eventual Ontario Action Plan 
for Health Care (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012). The Action Plan was 
tasked with determining better and more efficient ways to address chronic complaints 
and focus on preventive approaches to care, while addressing hospital wait times and 
accessibility. A significant way in which the plan’s authors envisioned achievement of 
this goal was through utilizing the primary health care reform that was already in 
progress, reconceptualizing front line care for patients. 
2.5. The Role of Feedback: Response to Delisting 
 
Doern and Phidd’s framework of ideas, structure and process can be used to 
sequentially plot how primary health care reform, through the lens of the status quo 
structure of the health care system, could be responsible for a decision such as delisting. 
Assuming Doern and Phidd’s framework is cyclical, then how the health care system 
reacted to the process is noticeably absent from their view. Feedback from the political 
opposition, as well as in the media, highlights how in the instance of delisting, the 
Ontario Liberals may have partially succeeded in reining in health care spending, but 
there were unintended outcomes from that decision. Certainly, the issue of primary 
health care reform was not solved as result of delisting. Instead, delisting appears to 
have been one of many steps intended to bring Ontario on board with health care reform 
happening in other provinces. This decades-long reform, envisioned by Tommy Douglas, 
was succinctly described by Marchildon as a reallocation of resources from “downstream 
illness care” to “upstream illness prevention and health promotion”, and the 
democratization of health decision-making (Marchildon, 2005). As it evolved over the 
next several years, the provincial government’s health care strategy incorporated 
experimentation with structure, and the government shifted the focus of the reform to 
target other health professions. Outcomes from past policy decisions ought to be 
 
 




accounted for as potential, causal factors for future iterations of ideas, changes to 
structure, and processes in the name of long-term initiatives. Primary health care reform 
continues to be a prominent issue in national health care policy more than 15 years after 
the Romanow Report was published. Some of the health care concerns faced by the 
present-day provincial government parallel the projections made by detractors of 
delisting back in 2004. 
2.5.1. Consequences of Delisting 
 
Political opposition to the McGuinty government’s decision to delist health 
services from OHIP at Queen’s Park, and others who expressed dissent in the media, 
centred on the concern of equal access for individuals who would no longer be able to 
afford their care. MPPs raised the concerns of individual constituents such as Judy 
Trudel of Kapuskasing (Bisson, 2004) and Cindy Beatty (Witmer, 2004b). There was 
also concern expressed on behalf of entire ridings, such as Howard Hampton’s, where 
many Ontarians were doing heavy industrial work, who would no longer be able to afford 
specific types of care after delisting occurred (Hampton, 2004). In the media, public 
concerns were voiced as well. Maureen Henderson, a Toronto chiropractor, commented 
that the benefit of a cost savings of $157 million a year would be far outstripped by the 
number of Ontarians, mostly poor and retired, who did not have extended health care. 
These individuals would not be able to afford the cut health services, and would be 
forced into emergency wards across the province (Harding, 2004). The reaction of the 
political opposition, as part of the parliamentary process, is to be expected however, the 
public reaction appeared to support these assertions. A Toronto Star article cited a 
health premium and delisting as the top two reasons for a 15-point slip for the Liberals in 
a Nanos Research poll in the summer of 2004. The same article cited an EKOS 
Research poll which found that the majority of Ontarians considered the 2004 provincial 
budget “bad” or “terrible” (Urquhart, 2004). Of the 47% of individuals expressing 
discontent for the McGuinty government in a later Ipsos-Reid poll, the majority came 
from rural Ontario, and were more likely to be aged 55 or older (Ipsos-Reid Corp, 2004). 
The discontent was temporary, and the McGuinty government would eventually regain 








2.5.2. Long-term Outcomes of Delisting 
 
The long-term outcomes of decisions made in their first term quickly became the 
concern of historians and health policy scholars. On the one hand, other decisions made 
in provincial health care attracted attention; after the Ontario Liberals secured a majority 
government in the 2007 election, another heath care scandal erupted concerning 
eHealth Ontario in 2009 (CBC News, 2009). This served to shift attention away from 
decisions made in the previous term. On the other hand, a number of factors make the 
study of how the public was affected difficult. For instance, other government decisions, 
such as the health premium, or the implementation of the LHINs, obscure the impact that 
delisting may have had on Ontarians’ access to care. When considering the concerns 
raised by Dr. Henderson about vulnerable populations accessing emergency services, 
this too is difficult to study. MacKay et al. mention that the health care system cost for 
MSK disorders is great, including emergency department utilization, and that a strategy 
involving health human resources is called for (MacKay et al., 2010). Mustard et al. 
published data which show an increase in MSK complainants’ utilization of emergency 
services in Ontario in 2005 and 2006, but it was followed by a decline afterwards. They 
admit that a number of variables, including changing classifications, a recession in 2008, 
and improvement in workplace safety training may have influenced the decline in claims 
(Mustard, Chambers, Ibrahim, Etches, & Smith, 2014). Finally, historical analysis of other 
health services delisting data across Canada in the 1990s reveals that scholars have 
trouble pinpointing the effects of such health policy decisions. Stabile and Ward report 
that partial delisting at that time had a negative effect on the probability individuals with 
household incomes of less than $30,000 would utilize physiotherapy, optometry and 
chiropractic services, regardless of insurance coverage. However, the data for utilization 
does not follow a predictable rule, and for some populations, there is an increase in 
utilization of health services following delisting (Stabile & Ward, 2006). While 
understanding the effects of delisting on the general population is complicated, it is 
possible to see how the professions targeted by delisting fared. 
The decision to delist chiropractic, physiotherapy and optometry services from 
OHIP has been considered from the perspective of patients’ utilization of the health care 
system in Ontario, but it may also be considered from the perspective of potential impact 
on the health workforce. A report by CIHI spanning the years 1997-2011 shows that in 
2004, the number of practicing physiotherapists in the province dropped from 5,921 to 
 
 




5,494 (8%), and in 2005, they saw a further decline of 180 practitioners (3%). The total 
number of optometrists in Ontario dropped by 2% in 2005, and while the number of 
chiropractors continued to grow throughout the period, the surge seen in previous years 
of roughly 6% per year dropped in half to an average of 3% from 2005 until 2010 
(Canadian Institute of Health Information, 2013). The total number of health 
professionals working in the province gives some indication of the well-being of each 
group, but tools exist to give greater meaning to this data, and assess more precisely 
how professionals behaved. Landry et al. studied the three main sectors in which 
physiotherapists operate: “Hospital”, “Community” and “Long-Term Care”. They asserted 
that all sectors expanded from 1999-2007, seemingly at odds with the attrition evident in 
CIHI’s data, but Landry’s team also noted that the growth in this profession was much 
slower than others (Landry et al., 2012). Of the three sectors, “Community” and “Long-
Term Care” experienced both the greatest influx of professionals, and the weakest 
retention in 2005 and 2006. Most remarkably, nearly half of all practitioners moving in to 
the Long-Term-Care sector in 2004 had moved out again by 2005, and by 2006, 
physiotherapists in this sector did not fare much better (Landry et al., 2012). There is no 
equivalent study concerning optometrists at the time of delisting. Sweetman and Yang 
studied chiropractors, and concluded that the profession saw earnings reductions in the 
years following delisting, at the cost of “reduced service delivery and increased private-
sector payments” (Leonard & Sweetman, 2014; Sweetman & Yang, 2013). However, 
chiropractors have not been studied from the perspective of retention, and such a study 
might be able to create parallels between the experiences of chiropractors and Landry et 
al.’s findings for physiotherapists.  
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The McGuinty government’s move to delist health services in 2004 highlighted 
cost-savings as a major objective of its budget, redirecting those funds to the initiative of 
primary care reform. In so doing, it may also have contributed to longer-term systemic 
concerns, such as negatively impacting how health care addresses chronic complaints in 
Ontario. The province was simultaneously moving toward reforming the health care 
system to one that would draw on teams of health professionals. It is therefore not only 
important to understand how provincial government decisions affected the public, but 
also how those decisions might have affected the health workforce. The remainder of my 
work will look at how delisting chiropractic services might have affected the number of 
 
 




chiropractors who practice in Ontario. As a persistently utilized health human resource 
dedicated mainly to MSK disorders, the province’s ability to retain these professionals 









CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
3.1. Research Design 
 
I conducted a quantitative, longitudinal analysis of a cohort including all 
chiropractors registered to practice with the CCO from 1996-2007. I employed 
secondary use of administrative data collected for regulatory body registration purposes. 
3.2. Ethical Review and Confidentiality 
 
The study protocol was reviewed and approved by the University of Ontario 
Institute of Technology Research Ethics Board, File # 13-126 (Appendix C).  
Confidentiality was assured by assigning randomly generated, unique identifiers 
to each registrant in the database. Postal codes were truncated to forward sortation 
areas anonymize registrant location, as this was a potential identifier for registrants living 
in more isolated regions of the province. All files containing registrant information were 
encrypted and password-protected, and then stored on a secure server at the Canadian 
Memorial Chiropractic College (CMCC).  
3.3. Data Source: College of Chiropractors of Ontario Database 
 
I obtained permission from the CCO to use annual registration data collected on 
all registrants in their database in 2014 (see Appendix C). Representatives there were 
able to grant access to a comprehensive database of registrants. Since chiropractors 
must be registered with the CCO to practice in Ontario, this list included all licensed 
practitioners of chiropractic who worked in the province until 2013. It was then necessary 
to work with the CCO, making use of their directories to follow each registrant over time, 
and making note of each status switch and location change. Between the CCO and the 
historical records at the Canadian Memorial Chiropractic College, I was able to secure 
CCO Membership Directories dating back to 1996. I was able to secure each successive 
year until 2007. The membership directory for the year 2008 could not be located, and 
given the amount of labour required to incorporate each directory into the database, I 
made the decision to confine my inquiry to the years 1996-2007. The data conversion 
process lasted from September, 2015 until September, 2016. 
I included the years leading to 2004 in the analysis to establish normative data 
for CCO registrants in Ontario. These normative data were compared to practitioner 
 
 




behaviour, measured by switches in CCO registration status, after delisting. I chose a 
longer lead up time to draw comparisons to, and build upon previous work describing the 
state of the chiropractic profession in Ontario during this period (Kopansky-Giles & 
Papadopoulos, 1997; Mior & Laporte, 2008; Mior & Waalen, 2008; Waalen & Mior, 
2005). For example, Mior and Laporte triangulated registrant information from the CCO 
database with enrollment and tuition data from the CMCC, as well as administrative and 
insurance billing data from OHIP, for the years 1990 to 2004 (Mior & Laporte, 2008).  
3.3.1. Database and Variables  
 
The CCO registrant database consists of personal and educational information 
for all chiropractors registered to practice in Ontario. The database contained the 
following 6 items:   
 Date of Birth 
 Sex 
 Year of Graduation 
 School of Graduation 
 Postal Code 
 Status 
Additional employment sector data (e.g., academic, or associateships versus 
private ownership of clinics) has been used in other health labour force studies. Hastie 
stratified occupational therapist registrants by employment categories such as 
‘Permanent’, ‘Temporary’, ‘Self-Employed’ or ‘On Leave’ (Hastie, 2009). Landry et al. 
were able to categorize physiotherapists by place of employment, e.g., ‘Hospital’, 
‘Community’ and ‘Long-Term Care’ (Landry et al., 2012). Unfortunately, neither the 
CCO’s nor any other available databases collect such information, thus limiting access 
to other employment related variables. 
All efforts were made to show that the regulatory body collected the same 
information for each year that was analyzed. Where possible, source documents, such 
as registration forms, allow researchers the opportunity to ascertain that the information 
present in a database has been collected using the same questions. This is important in 
order to ensure that the variables do not change over time. Therefore, I followed up with 
the CCO in November, 2014 to request copies of the annual registration forms from 
1996 to 2007. I was informed over the next several months that a search would be 
 
 




performed by the regulatory body. When the search was completed, I was informed that 
these forms were not held on file, and my contact at the CCO could do little more than to 
assure me that no changes were made to the registration form during those years. 
3.3.2. Independent Variables 
 
The independent variable chosen for this study was Status. Status is used by the 
CCO to define registrant employment status and activity levels. It is tracked under the 
following types: 
 Active 
 Non-Resident Active 
 Inactive 
 Non-Resident Inactive 
 Retired 
 
For purpose of analysis, these five types were then converted into three general variable 
classes, active, inactive and retired. 
3.3.2.1. Independent Variable Class: Active 
 
Practitioners holding an Active status constitute chiropractors who had paid their 
registration fees, and who had the ability to operate in the province without hindrance. 
Registrants holding an Active status each year at the CCO were vetted by the college, 
and found to have graduated from an accredited program, and successfully passed 
licensing examinations. Active registrants are the only registrants who are capable of 
full-time practice in the province.  
3.3.2.2. Independent Variable Class: Inactive  
 
I classified the following variables/statuses as Inactive: 
 Non-Resident Active 
 Inactive 
 Non-Resident Inactive 
 
In order to be listed under these statuses, registrants would have had to make a status 
switch on their registration forms that year. Although Non-Resident Active registrants 
continue to be able to contribute to the health workforce, their status delineates that they 
 
 




are no longer in the province, and therefore they have chosen to re-locate elsewhere, 
despite the potential for occasional contributions.  
3.3.2.3. Independent Variable Class: Retired 
 
Registrants listed under the Retired status were given a different classification 
than Inactive or Non-Resident registrants. For Retired registrants other, potentially 
confounding factors, likely influenced their decision to switch status. The largest factor 
driving registrants to make this switch would be age, or stage in career.  
3.3.3. Dependent Variables 
 
The following dependent variables were used in my model: date of birth, sex, 
year of graduation, school of graduation, and postal code (which has been changed to 
Local Health Integration Network, as explained below).    
3.3.3.1. Date of Birth 
 
I chose Date of Birth to determine when registrants were susceptible to changes 
which might have acted as confounding factors in the analysis. For example, I chose to 
collect Date of Birth to calculate female registrants who may be starting families, and 
therefore may be taking extended absences from practice. I also chose Date of Birth to 
compare registrants ages to the year they graduated, to be able to determine more 




I collected registrant data on Sex because it allowed me to explore the theme of 
diversity and equality among chiropractors. Additionally, I chose Sex to be able to 
explore the theme of female health professionals and raising families; evidence states 
that education and fertility are inversely related, and this particularly affects females who 
study scientific disciplines (Adamo, 2013; Boulis, 2004; Wolfinger, Goulden, & Mason, 
2010). Garke and Dollin reported that 60% of Canadian medical students - and 49-62% 
of those enrolled in medical specialty schools - were female in 2008. They claimed that 
raising a family disproportionately influenced which specialty females chose as a career 
(Gartke & Dollin, 2010). Sex was also found by Mior and Waalen to be a predictor of 
practice income (Mior & Waalen, 2008). The self-reported sex of chiropractors in Ontario 
 
 




provides a window into how factors such as maternity and income disparity might be 
affecting the health workforce, as well as being able to generate comparators for other 
professions.  
3.3.3.3. Years in Practice 
 
The CCO variable Year of Graduation was used as a proxy for the number of 
years that practitioners have been in practice. Registrant number of years’ experience in 
practice is helpful as a potential indicator to determine the probability that newer 
practitioners were more prone to switch to inactive status than their more established 
counterparts. An earlier, 2005 study by Waalen and Mior posited that chiropractors in 
practice for more than six years bring in the highest earnings (Waalen & Mior, 2005). 
This is further supported by their later study, which found that mean income and average 
number of new patients peaked between 8-13 years in practice (Mior & Waalen, 2008).  
I subtracted the year being analyzed from the self-reported graduation date that 
each registrant supplied on the registration forms to create the variable Years in 
Practice, referring to the number of years since a registrant graduated from their 
chiropractic training program. I then used Waalen and Mior’s evidence of higher 
earnings to break out registrants into five-year intervals (Waalen & Mior, 2005). I 
stratified Years in Practice into 7 groups: 
 < 5 Years 
 6-10 Years 
 11-15 Years 
 16-20 Years 
 21-25 Years 
 26-30 Years 
 > 30 Years 
I chose this variable to help determine when practitioners were choosing to retire, 
and whether this changed over time.  
3.3.3.4. School of Graduation 
 
The variable School of Graduation provided me with information on how many 
registrants were trained in-province, and how many were coming from institutions 
outside. I chose to track where registrants graduated in order to describe the proportion 
 
 




of graduates from different schools making up the workforce in Ontario, and how it has 
changed over time. This allowed me to compare how attractive the province was for 
people trained locally, as opposed to those who trained elsewhere. 
Kopansky-Giles and Papadopoulos reported that the school from which Ontario 
chiropractors graduated from had an effect on earnings, although the magnitude of this 
effect was debated by Mior and Waalen (Kopansky-Giles & Papadopoulos, 1997; Mior & 
Waalen, 2008). A longitudinal analysis of retention using this variable may therefore 
contribute further insight into this practice characteristic. 
3.3.3.5. Local Health Integration Networks (LHIN) 
 
The variable Postal Code was provided in a truncated format, with only the first 
three digits of the code or the forward sortation area. I requested the regional data in this 
format in order to employ a data set with similar characteristics to Mior and Waalen’s 
2008 paper, and to provide the same level of confidentiality. They concluded that inner-
city Toronto chiropractors had lower incomes compared to their counterparts elsewhere 
in the province (Mior & Waalen, 2008). I gathered registrant location in order to explore 
whether differences in retention existed between urban and rural practitioners. I also 
chose location to study which areas were more attractive for chiropractors to work in 
Ontario.  
Mior and Waalen’s use of postal codes allowed for stratification into only four 
regional categories (Mior & Waalen, 2008). I was able to use a conversion algorithm to 
reclassify these regions into LHINs, in order to employ a more sensitive location 
analysis, with the aim of further exploring regional differences.  
3.3.4. Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
 
All chiropractors registered with the CCO between the years 1996-2007 were 
included for analysis. Registrants listed on the CCO database who did not appear as 
Active or Non-Resident Active for at least one year during the time frame were excluded 
from analysis, since these individuals did not make up part of the practicing health 
professional workforce for chiropractors, and did not have decision-making power to 
cease practice for the duration of the study. Additionally, active registrants who switched 
to Inactive, Non-Resident Inactive or Retired statuses, or who no longer held any status 
at all within one year of graduating from a chiropractic program were excluded. Recently 
 
 




graduating individuals were excluded in order to account for practitioners who returned 
to their home provinces or countries after completing their studies in Ontario. 
3.3.5. Data Analysis  
 
3.3.5.1. Descriptive Data 
 
I began by compiling descriptive data, and reporting on frequencies and 
proportions. I described registrant frequencies by Date of Birth, Sex, Years in Practice, 
School of Graduation, and LHIN.  
3.3.5.2. Stickiness and Inflow Analysis 
 
In order to investigate the retention of chiropractors in Ontario, I used the 
variables to form subgroups, and applied the concepts of ‘Stickiness’ and ‘Inflow’. 
Alameddine et al. introduced these parameters to describe changes in a setting relative 
to its expansion or shrinkage (Alameddine et al., 2006). It was originally developed to 
study whether nurses working in a particular setting in a particular time period would 
continue to work in that setting in the next time period (e.g., from a hospital to a long-
term care setting), as well as to calculate how many new nurses were entering a setting 
in one time period who were not in that setting in the previous one. This methodology 
has since been used to describe a number of other professions, including respiratory 
therapists, occupational therapists and physiotherapists, among others (Alameddine et 
al., 2009; Alameddine et al., 2011; Berta et al., 2013; Gamble et al., 2011; Hastie, 2009; 
Landry et al., 2012). My study will add the analysis of chiropractors to this growing body 
of literature. 
Stickiness analysis is a tool that can determine how key variables may impact the 
attractiveness of Ontario for chiropractors to practice in the years studied. In this study, 
the number of chiropractors working in the province, per Active versus Inactive 
registration status for all CCO registrants, was counted and compared between a given 
year (t) and then the next year in sequence (t+1). The term t refers to the yearly cut-off 

















]  × 100 
 
where 𝑁𝑡 represents all CCO registrants in a year, and 𝑁𝑡&𝑡+1 represents all CCO 
registrants who continued to be active in the following year. 
Inflow refers to the amount of new practitioners entering the profession each year. A 
high Inflow indicates professional expansion for chiropractors in Ontario, as it implies 
that more new practitioners are entering the workforce. It is determined by subtracting 
the number of registrants in year t-1 from year t. 
 




]  × 100 
 
where 𝑁𝑡&𝑡−1 represents the total CCO registrants in a year, plus the total CCO 
registrants in the prior year. 
The variable t was measured in intervals of one year, commencing at the CCO’s 
predetermined registration cut-off date. Stickiness for time t was measured by taking the 
number of active registrants at t who continue to be active at t+1, annotated as t&t+1. 
For our purposes, t+1 represents data collected for the interval immediately following 
time t. This total was then divided by the number of registrants at time t. In that way, time 
t was set up as a baseline in each segment. Inflow was measured by subtracting the 
number of registrants active in t and the year before (t&t-1) from registrants who were 
active at time t. Analysis was conducted on all intervals from 1996-2007. 
 Stickiness and Inflow outputs are represented as percentage scores. The overall 
attractiveness of the profession may be inferred by comparing percentages between 
years. Plots of Stickiness by year and Inflow by year were prepared and examined for 
any trends over time or any years that stood out as a point of inflection or change. 
In addition to the overall population switching from Active to Inactive class, I 
analyzed the relationship between attractiveness of the profession and other variables 
listed above using a Cox proportional hazards model with time to inactive as the 
outcome. The Cox analysis provided hazard ratios, establishing ratios, their confidence 
limits and p-values (testing ratio=1) to make inferences about which individual 
characteristics contributed to increased likelihood of practitioners switching from Active 
to Inactive class. 
 
 




3.3.5.3. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis: Outcome Definition and Modification 
 
 I conducted a Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis to assess the 
frequency of registrants switching from Active to Inactive class. Cox Proportional 
Hazards models the hazard function of a time to event outcome with effects of variables 
expressed as Hazard Ratios to make inferences about the relationship between the 
independent variables and time to event. The model results can be used to identify 
which subgroups are more or less likely to experience the event of interest at any given 
time. A basic assumption of the model is that hazards for different levels of an 
independent variable are proportional over time, so that the hazard ratios do not vary 
over time. However, this assumption can be tested and the model can be extended to 
allow for time-varying hazard ratios. 
Survival analysis requires the establishment of an event to which a cohort is 
exposed within a given time frame. The event is represented as a switch in the event 
indicator variable from “0” to “1” in the data set: either the event happened in a given 
year, conditional on it not having happened before, or the event did not happen. The 
event set was a switch from Active to Inactive class. Although registrants in this project 
may have experienced the event more than once, upon experiencing the event, they 
were removed from the at-risk population. 
I used the variables Years in Practice, Sex, School of Graduation and LHIN. Date 
of Birth was not analyzed, as it was found to correlate strongly with Years in Practice. 
Registrants may have been more easily identified using Date of Birth, a factor which 
would need to be considered when presenting the results of the study. Years in Practice 
was considered a superior indicator, since it was based instead on the number of years 
that a practitioner had been practicing in their field. For the variable Years in Practice the 
group 11-15 yrs was used as the reference group because descriptive analysis revealed 
that this subcategory had a middling amount of practitioners in a relatively stable phase 
of their career. These assumptions are supported by Mior and Waalen (Mior & Waalen, 
2008). 
Sex and School of Graduation were included in the model as dichotomous 
variables. For Sex, males were representative of roughly 70% of the sample population 
and were therefore used as the reference group. For School of Graduation, since 
graduates of CMCC comprised slightly more than 70% of all registrants recorded in the 
data, I compared graduates of that institution to graduates of all other institutions 
 
 




appearing in the data set, using CMCC graduates as the reference group. Graduates 
from ‘non-CMCC’ institutions were trained at foreign institutions, or in the case of a 
handful of registrants, out of province, at the Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières 
(UQTR). CMCC is the only school in English-speaking Canada to confer a Doctor of 
Chiropractic degree. All other institutions, save UQTR, recorded in the registrant 
database are located either in the United States, or the United Kingdom.  
Finally, LHIN was treated as a categorical variable with categories as shown in 
Figure 4-14. Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant was chosen as the reference LHIN, 
since the number of observations for this area was close to the median for all groups, 
and the descriptive analysis made clear that the fluctuation in registrant numbers was 
not as great in this region. 
Registrants holding an Active status for at least one year during the period 
studied were counted as exposed. In addition to the exclusion criteria mentioned above, 
registrants with 20 years or more in practice switching to Retired status at any point 
during the years studied were excluded from analysis. These switches represented 
cases where there was potential for other confounding factors influencing the switch 
from Active to another status.    
3.3.5.4. Cox Proportional Hazards: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The CCO has an exception built in for registrants which allows them to 
temporarily switch from Active to Inactive class for up to five years, and then revert to 
Active status. Therefore, I conducted a sensitivity analysis to see the influence on the 
results of including those registrants experiencing the main outcome. In the sensitivity 
analysis, the outcome event was defined by switching from Active to Inactive class for 
two consecutive years instead of just one. 
The CCO allows registrants to switch to Inactive status, and then switch back to 
Active status in the following year, without penalizing them. For registrants who do not 
plan to practice within a time frame, this temporary switch is advantageous, since it 
allows them the opportunity to return after a short hiatus, where they are only required to 
repay the registration fee for the year that they stay inactive, if they chose to return to 
practice. For example, registrants who administratively manage a clinic, or registrants in 
the academic sector, may wish to leave the option open to return to practice following 
other obligations. A registrant may remain inactive as many as five years before the 
CCO enforces sanctions such as re-writing the licensing examinations. Since there is 
 
 




allowance in the system for registrants to temporarily switch statuses without penalty, 
sensitivity analysis was merited to determine that any effects observed were not owing 
to a sub-population of registrants who made use of this exception, and who may 
therefore have switched from Active to Inactive, and then back to Active class again. In 
the Cox Proportional Hazards analysis, a switch from Active to Inactive class was treated 
as an event, regardless of whether they returned to practice in Ontario in any of the 
years following. 
In the sensitivity analysis, the unaltered data set was revisited, and an event was 
counted only in cases where a switch was made from Active to Inactive class for at least 
two years. This was done because while registrants might be listed as inactive for more 
than two years without penalty, such a switch would have resulted in the loss of 
chiropractic practice as a main source of income. Further, those registrants who 
remained inactive for more than two years were not practicing in Ontario, and if they had 
not migrated elsewhere, they may have been plying a different trade for subsistence, 
whether practice management, academic, or other. Regardless, these registrants were 
no longer practising chiropractic, which is the outcome of interest in this study. 
3.3.5.5. Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis: Time-Varying Analysis 
 
After the basic Cox proportional hazards models were fit and examined, the 
proportional hazards assumption was tested by including interactions between each 
independent variable and time. The years selected for comparison against the entire 
timeframe were selected based on anomalous results in the Stickiness and Inflow 
output. A priori, the delisting of chiropractic services announced in December 2004 was 
of interest and so trend changes that might be tied to that event were scrutinized more 
carefully. 
The basic Cox proportional hazards survival analysis model assumes that the 
relationship between explanatory variables and the outcome, or the risk of becoming 
Inactive, is constant over time. Given the delisting policy of 2004, I wanted to check 
whether that assumption of time invariance was appropriate. This was checked by 
introducing time-varying effects for each independent variable. 
A comparison was made between overall hazard ratios, and those for two 
specific years, with the intention of identifying whether relationships between the 
independent variables and time to event were the same over the entire time frame, or 
whether they might vary by year. Beta values and variance and covariance elements for 
 
 




each variable studied were elicited, to compute hazard ratios and 95% CI by year to 
determine whether and where they varied.  
The data was organized and imported into Stata (StataCorp. 2013. Stata 
Statistical Software: Release 13. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.)
 
 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1. Results Overview 
 
This chapter progresses sequentially through the results as they were reached. I 
will cover the descriptive results first: frequencies and proportions of CCO registrants 
from 1996-2007, stratified by each variable studied. Next, I have displayed the 
profession-wide results from the Stickiness and Inflow analysis. Finally, I present the 
results from the Cox Proportional Hazards Survival Analysis, again breaking out the 
description by variable. Discussion will follow in the next chapter.   
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
I created graphs of proportions and drew up a frequency table to describe 
changes in the sample population based on each variable collected. This section 
contains a table describing the frequencies of registrants by CCO status type, year by 
year. Next, I report on registrants in all statuses, with the exception of the descriptive 
analysis of LHINs in Section 4.2.5. For LHINs, I utilized data only on registrants with an 
Active status. All tables and figures for the descriptive analysis were prepared in 
Microsoft Excel (Version 16.5.)  













  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Active 1863 2015 2170 2255 2397 2573 2756 2905 3010 3148 3136 3249 
Non-Res Active 18 27 42 36 39 55 47 63 68 46 44 58 
Inactive 45 48 43 53 60 59 76 75 98 123 115 125 
Non-Res Inactive 9 12 17 24 36 32 49 54 59 73 70 50 
Retired 20 20 26 31 34 36 35 44 57 76 75 91 
Not Listed 0 43 78 115 155 206 258 310 375 395 586 612 
TOTAL 1955 2165 2376 2514 2721 2961 3221 3451 3667 3861 4026 4185 
              
Table 4-1: CCO registrants by status, year to year. Non-Resident has been abbreviated to “Non-Res”. 
4.2.1. Date of Birth 
 
For Date of Birth, the number of registrants in the 65 or older category is small, 
thus risking the potential to reveal registrant identity. Therefore, I have reported 
proportions for Date of Birth rather than frequencies to mitigate against possible 
identification of registrants. Five groups were created, separated into 10-year categories; 
with the first group representing the youngest registrant and the last for those aged 65 
and older. The proportions have been plotted in the bar graph in Figure 4-1. The variable 
Date of Birth is presented using five groups. The youngest registrants with an Active 
 
 




status in the data set were 23 years old. Registrants’ graduation years were subtracted 
from their age to reach an average graduation age of 27.8 years (s.d.=3.26). 
 Figure 4-1 shows that the overall proportion of registrants under the age of 35 
starts out at 36%, peaks at 44% in 2003, and then declines by the end of the reported 
period to 34%. In the second group of registrants, aged 35-44 years old, the proportion 
tapers from 44% to 28% in the middle of the time frame, and then grows again to 35% 
towards the end. There is an increase in the proportion of registrants aged 45-54 from 
15% to 21% in 1999, which remains constant throughout the rest of the time frame. 
There is also a change in proportion of registrants aged 55-64 from 3% at the outset to 
9% by the year 2007. 
 




The male and female ratio changed during the years studied. Registrant 
frequencies indicated that the number of female registrants in Ontario almost tripled from 
382 to 1,071. Figure 4-2 shows a steady, gradual change in male-female proportions, so 
that at the beginning of the time frame, the ratio of male to female practitioners was 
80:20, and by the end, the ratio was 70:30. About 1% of registrants did not report their 
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Figure 4-2: CCO registrants proportionally by self-reported sex, 1996-2007. 
4.2.3. Years in Practice 
 
The number of registrants with less than five years’ experience peaks at 926 in 
the year 2004, and afterwards begins to decline (Table 4-2). Registrants in the 6-10 yrs 
and 11-15 yrs categories, as well as those who had been practicing for more than 20 
years grew in number. Notably, the number of registrants in the 6-10 yrs category more 
than doubled in the time frame, overtaking the 0-5 yrs category in the last year studied.  
 Registrant numbers in the 16-20 yrs category grew at the beginning of the time 
studied, but from 1999 onwards experienced a drop in numbers in each consecutive 
year until 2004. Growth occurs in the last three years, although the number of registrants 
does not recover to the amount in 1996. Declines also occur in the 16-20 yrs and 21-25 
yrs groups close to the time that delisting was deliberated and passed into effect. 
The graduation date was not captured for roughly 5% of registrants in the 
database and excluded from this analysis. 














 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0-5 yrs 450 550 661 684 766 822 898 915 926 920 832 781 
6-10 yrs 322 338 350 373 401 471 547 638 705 788 825 875 
11-15 yrs 329 321 311 306 308 319 330 344 371 404 452 521 
16-20 yrs 363 370 381 372 347 332 311 301 296 301 303 314 
21-25 yrs 143 188 225 270 320 347 362 371 357 330 310 298 
26-30 yrs 80 78 81 98 110 134 180 217 259 311 322 338 
> 30 yrs 184 187 193 196 204 208 208 215 230 258 268 323 
              
Table 4-2: Registrants stratified by number of years in practice. 
4.2.4. School of Graduation 
 
 The registrants were then analyzed according to the schools from which they 
received their chiropractic training. Figure 4-3 highlights that the proportion of Canadian-
educated chiropractors practicing in the province of Ontario remained the dominant 


























faction between the years 1996-2007. As with Sex, there was a steady, gradual shift in 
the ratio of CMCC to non-CMCC graduates in the period studied, starting from 89:11 at 
the outset, settling to 72:28 for the last four years recorded. The number of graduates 
from foreign institutions registering to practice at the CCO accelerated rapidly from the 
beginning of the time frame, peaked in 2000-2001, and then slowed to more 
conservative growth from 2004 to the end of the time studied. The number of CMCC 
graduates practicing in Ontario grew by a factor of roughly 1.5, from 1,746 to 2,562 
during the study period. In contrast, non-CMCC graduates nearly quintupled from 209 to 
1,012. 
 The registrant population included graduates from 19 institutions other than 
CMCC. The largest number of foreign graduates completed their training at the National 
University of Health Sciences, followed by New York Chiropractic College.  
 
Figure 4-3: CCO registrants proportionally by School of Graduation, 1996-2007. 
4.2.5. LHINs 
 
In relation to the location of the registrants, data were collected across all LHINs 
in Ontario. Given the number of categories, a bar graph has been provided to more 
easily assess fluctuations in registrant location. Figure 4-4 presents the frequencies of 
registrants in each area of Ontario, progressing from LHIN 1 on the left to LHIN 14 at the 
end, on the right. Since growth occurred across all regions, the frequencies in 1996 are 
represented with the wider, darker bars in the background, and the numerical values 
listed at their lower peaks. The frequencies of registrant location in 2007 are presented 
in the foreground, with the thinner, lighter bars. I calculated the proportion of registrants 
in each LHIN relative to the total number of registrants in 1996, and then listed the 
change in that proportion as calculated in 2007 in parentheses next to the frequencies 
listed for each LHIN in 2007.  


























The frequencies and proportions reveal that Central, located to the north of 
Toronto, contained the most registrants by 2007, becoming more populated than 
Toronto Central. Hamilton Niagara and Central East maintained their statuses as the 
third and fourth most populous registrant areas in Ontario, although they did not grow as 
quickly as other areas, such as Mississauga Halton. Registrants in Champlain, in the 
Ottawa area, outgrew their counterparts in South West, which includes the city of 
London (refer to Figure 4-14 at the end of this chapter for a map). Although they are 
counted among the 7 least populous areas with respect to registrants, Waterloo Region, 
Erie St. Clair, North Simcoe Muskoka and Central West roughly double in number. The 
number of registrants in North East grew, but this LHIN had the poorest growth in the 
time studied.  
 

































































4.3. Data Standardization 
 
For purposes of analysis, Date of Birth was found to correlate strongly with Year 
of Graduation (r=0.95). Registrants may have been more easily identified using Date of 
Birth, a factor which would need to be considered when presenting the results of the 
study. Therefore, I decided to use Year of Graduation to calculate the number of years 
each registrant had been in practice, starting from their year of graduation, and to 
remove Date of Birth from my analysis.  
Thus, the revised list of dependent variables used in this work in the remainder of 
Chapters 4 and 5 is as follows: 
 Years in Practice 
 Local Health Integration Network 
 School of Graduation 
 Sex 
For the independent variable, Status, there were over 400 cases where 
registrants appeared in one year, but were not listed in the registry in the following year. 
These registrants sometimes underwent periods of inactivity, and then re-appeared 
under one of the other statuses again. During the periods for which no status was 
assigned, I created a sixth status category: Not Listed. This category was included with 
other inactive categories, since placement here would entail failure to submit the CCO 
annual registration form and pay the fee to remain an active practitioner in Ontario. 
4.4. Stickiness and Inflow for Total Sample Population 
 
 Stickiness and Inflow was calculated for the total number of registrants in 
Ontario, by year, as shown by the plots in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6. These plots 
indicate two points in time where the rate of growth for CCO registrants suddenly 
changed. For profession-wide Stickiness, the indicator is stable until 2004 when a larger 
precipitation occurred, followed by a sharp decline in 2006. 
An earlier disruption can be seen in the profession-wide Inflow chart in Figure 
4-6, in 1999. Growth occurs again from 2000-2002. Then, from 2003, there is a steady 
decline until 2006, when the Inflow indicator drops to roughly the same level as 1999. 
There is a small growth in 2007. 
 
 





4.5. Cox Proportional Hazards Survival Analysis 
 
To explore whether registrant characteristics might act as a predictor for switches 
from Active to Inactive, a Cox Proportional Hazards Survival Analysis was calculated. A 
cohort of 4,009 registrants was followed from 1996-2007, with 34,855 person-years of 
data. Two sets of data were processed for each variable. Sections 4.5.1-4 list Stata 
outputs for each variable from the original data set. A detailed account of the sensitivity 
analysis appears in Appendix A. The survival analysis results are not presented in this 
section because on the whole, they were very similar to the results presented here. 
However, I have made a note of those cases where the survival analysis differs 
prominently from the results in this section, and the reader may compare the charts 
presented in this Chapter with those listed in Appendix A. 
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 I started by plotting a Kaplan Meier Estimate of the survivor function to compare 
with the Stickiness results reported in Section 4.4 (Figure 4-7 and Table 4-3). In the year 
2006, the Kaplan Meier estimate demonstrates that approximately one fifth of all 
switches from Active to Inactive class occurred, and this also shows up as the biggest 
single year drop in the survivor function from 0.81 to 0.76 – a drop of 0.05, compared to 
most other years which have a drop on the order of 0.02-0.03. 
 


















205 1 . . 
1997 2068 54 192 0.97 0.00 0.97 – 0.98 
1998 2206 44 125 0.95 0.00 0.94 – 0.96 
1999 2287 54 188 0.93 0.01 0.92 – 0.94 
2000 2421 55 215 0.91 0.01 0.90 – 0.92 
2001 2581 46 244 0.89 0.01 0.88 – 0.91 
2002 2779 67 205 0.87 0.01 0.86 – 0.89 
2003 2917 76 191 0.85 0.01 0.84 – 0.86 
2004 3032 92 176 0.82 0.01 0.81 – 0.84 
2005 3116 63 151 0.81 0.01 0.79 – 0.82 
2006 3204 183 144 0.76 0.01 0.75 – 0.78 
2007 3165 92  0.74 0.01 0.72 – 0.75 
Table 4-3: The values used to plot the Kaplan Meier graph. Note the year 2006, where there is a drop 
equating to 20% of the total decline in the time studied. To calculate Active Registrant Total for the next year 





































1996 2000 2005 2010
year
Kaplan-Meier plot: all registrants
 
 




4.5.1. Years in Practice 
 
The group 11-10 yrs was chosen as the reference group for this variable. 
The group > 30 yrs shows a statistically significant (p<0.001) probability of 
switching to Inactive within the period analyzed compared to the reference group, with a 
hazard ratio of 2.02 (95%CI 1.48-2.77). The hazard ratio for 26-30 yrs is 1.22 (95%CI 
0.85-1.76). 
 Survival analysis shows that registrants in the group < 5 yrs were 1.33 times 
more likely (p<0.05; CI 1.04-1.73) to switch to Inactive compared to those in the 
reference group within this time frame. During the time frame studied, these registrants 
made up about a third of all cases analyzed.  
 Practitioners with 21-25 years’ experience were the least likely to switch to 
Inactive status (HR 0.71). The p value is statistically significant in the sensitivity analysis 
(p<0.05), and the hazard ratio drops further, to 0.66. The output shows that 6-10 yrs, 11-
15 yrs, 16-20 yrs had very similar hazards over time, while 21-25 yrs had slightly lower 
hazards and < 5 yrs, 26-30 yrs and > 30 yrs had significantly higher hazards of switching 
to Inactive. 
Group HRR s.e. z p 95% Conf. Interval 
< 5 yrs 1.33 0.17 2.18 0.03 1.03 1.71 
6-10 yrs 0.95 0.14 -0.35 0.73 0.71 1.27 
16-20 yrs 0.84 0.15 -1.02 0.31 0.60 1.18 
21-25 yrs 0.71 0.13 -1.84 0.07 0.49 1.02 
26-30 yrs 1.22 0.23 1.06 0.29 0.85 1.75 
> 30 yrs 2.03 0.32 4.45 0.00 1.48 2.77 
Table 4-4: Output for Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis of CCO registrants by years in practice. 
Group 4, or the group with 11-15 years’ experience, was chosen as the reference group. HRR represents 
the hazard rate ratio for which the 95% Confidence Interval has been provided in the leftmost column, and 
the standard error has been provided under s.e. Z scores and p values have been provided. 
4.5.2. Local Health Integration Networks 
 
 The next variable considered was registrant location, codified by LHIN as shown 
in Table 4-5. The reference group for this variable was Hamilton Niagara Haldimand 
Brant. 
 Of the LHINs, those where registrants had an increased likelihood of switching to 
Inactive status were Central, Champlain, North East and North West (8, 11, 13 and 14). 
In the sensitivity analysis in Appendix A, Central evidences a number of registrants who 
have only temporarily switched. Champlain remains relatively constant with regard to the 
sensitivity analyses. Champlain is also uniquely located in Ottawa and the surrounding 
 
 




regions, right on the border with Quebec. Of the LHINs with registrants more likely to 
cease practice, Central is the only region with a p value with statistical significance in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
 Conversely, LHINs where registrants had a decreased likelihood of switching to 
Inactive status were: South West, Waterloo Region, Central West and South East (2,3,5 
and 10). The hazard ratios did not change greatly when employing the sensitivity 
analysis. The most notable change was that the hazard ratio for South West, when 
adjusted for sensitivity, evidences statistical significance. Registrants in Central West 
were less than half as likely to switch to Inactive compared to their peers (HR 0.42/0.45).  
 
Group HRR s.e. z p 95% Conf. Interval 
Erie St. Clair 1.04 0.20 0.19 0.85 0.71 1.51 
South West 0.73 0.14 -1.64 0.10 0.50 1.06 
Waterloo Region 0.69 0.14 -1.81 0.07 0.46 1.03 
Central West 0.42 0.13 -2.71 0.01 0.23 0.79 
Mississauga Halton 0.96 0.16 -0.22 0.83 0.70 1.34 
Toronto Central 1.11 0.16 0.73 0.46 0.84 1.46 
Central 1.36 0.18 2.36 0.02 1.05 1.77 
Central East 1.15 0.17 0.95 0.34 0.86 1.53 
South East 0.66 0.18 -1.53 0.13 0.39 1.12 
Champlain 1.33 0.21 1.84 0.07 0.98 1.81 
North Simcoe Muskoka 0.87 0.19 -0.66 0.51 0.57 1.33 
North East 1.33 0.25 1.54 0.12 0.93 1.92 
North West 1.51 0.37 1.66 0.10 0.93 2.45 
Table 4-5: Output for Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis of CCO registrants by LHIN. The reference 
group for this analysis was Hamilton Niagara Haldimand Brant (LHIN 4). 
4.5.3. School of Graduation 
 
The reference group for this variable was CMCC. 
 The output in Table 4-6 reveals that graduates of foreign institutions were more 
likely (HR 1.33, p<0.001) to switch from Active to Inactive class during the years 1996-
2007. A relatively small confidence interval supports this assertion. 
 A Kaplan-Meier plot was generated for School of Graduation (Figure 4-8), to 
better visualize the rates at which registrants in each dichotomized category switched 
from Active to Inactive class. It is possible to distinguish the years 1999, 2004 and 2006 
as points in time when greater decline was experienced by either one or both groups. In 
the years 1999 and 2004, the declines are experienced at a greater rate for non-CMCC 
graduates. Comparatively, their CMCC graduate counterparts experience declines 
 
 




similar to other years. The decline seen in 2006 affects both groups, which experience 
their biggest drop that year (with the exception of the non-CMCC group’s decline in 
1997, described further below, in Chapter 5: Discussion).  
 
Group HRR s.e. z p 95% Conf. Interval 
Non-CMCC 1.33 0.10 3.65 0.00 1.14 1.54 
Table 4-6: Output for Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis of non-CMCC graduate CCO registrants. 
4.5.4. Sex 
 
The reference group for this variable was male. 
 The fourth and final category analyzed using Cox Proportional Hazards was Sex. 
The number of observations supports the gender divide in chiropractic reported 
elsewhere (Mior, 2010; Mior & Waalen, 2008) at a ratio of 3:1 in the male-female (76% 
male, 24% female) divide in those cases where information on sex was available. The 
output in Table 4-7 shows that females were more likely to cease practice in Ontario 
during this timeframe (HR 1.60, p<0.001).  
The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate plot shown in Figure 4-9 indicates when 
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Kaplan-Meier plot: School of Graduation
Figure 4-8: Survival plot of registrants using School of Graduation 
 
 




and School of Graduation are similar: however, female registrant numbers appear to 
have declined at a more noticeable rate than males in the year 2000, and; once again, 
there was a larger number of status switches for both sexes in the year 2006, which 
carries over to 2007 for female registrants. 
 
Group HRR s.e. z p 95% Conf. Interval 
female 1.60 0.12 6.41 0 1.39 1.85 
Table 4-7: Output for Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis of female CCO registrants. 
 
4.6. Survival Analysis: Time-Varying Coefficients 
 
Hazard Rate Ratios (HRR) were produced to allow for the study of specific years, 
since the results in Section 4.4 and in the Kaplan Meier plots pointed to the years 1999 
and 2006. The results for the year 1999 appear in Appendix B, although they did not 
reveal any statistically significant time-varying effects. The results for the year 2006 
appear in Appendix B, and statistically significant effects were detected for that year. 









































Figure 4-9: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate plot by sex. 
 
 




4.6.1. Time-Varying Coefficient Analysis of the Year 2006 
 
The analysis of Time-Varying Coefficients reveals that comparatively, in 2006, 
the behaviour of registrants according to the variable Years in Practice is statistically 
different from other years. There is an increase in hazard ratios across all categories 
analyzed in the year 2006. Figure 4-10 demonstrates aggregate hazard rate ratios and 
confidence intervals, split by the variable categories of Years in Practice.  
I have drawn a blue dotted line across the groups to indicate the U-shaped 
pattern exemplifying registrant likelihood of switching statuses for the years 1996-2007, 
excluding the year 2006. Next, I drew a red dotted line drawn through the hazard rate 
ratios determined for the year 2006. The dotted lines help to highlight an increase in 
hazard ratios across all categories for 2006, compared to other years. 
Figure 4-11 provides a similar comparison for registrant locations which experienced the 
greatest changes in 2006, compared to all other years. Moving from left to right on the 
figure, the hazard ratios in Central and Central East doubled in 2006, with the lower 
bounds of the associated confidence intervals above 1. North East mirrors this to a 
lesser degree. In contrast, the change in North West occurs in the opposite direction, 
















Years in Practice (All Years vs 2006)
Time-Varying Analysis: Years in Practice
<5 yrs 16-20 yrs 21-25 yrs 26-30 yrs >30 yrs6-10 yrs
All yrs
2006
Figure 4-10: Time-Varying Analysis by Years in Practice (reference group: 11-16 yrs). The blue boxes refer 
to Hazard Rate Ratios for all years except 2006, and the red circles refer to Hazard Rate Ratios for the year 
2006 alone. The whiskers cover the confidence intervals. For this figure, I have drawn lines through each set 
of Hazard Rate Ratios to clarify the unanimous increase in magnitude for the year 2006. 
 
 




Finally, analysis of 2006 demonstrates changes in the variables School of 
Graduation and Sex, where the hazard ratios are reduced, as is clarified in Figure 4-12 
and Figure 4-13. For most years, female CCO registrants were more likely to switch to 
Inactive than male, but this difference is not as apparent in 2006. The same observation 
was evident for non-CMCC graduates.  
 
Figure 4-11: Time-Varying analysis results for registrant location. An excerpt of Central, Central East, 
Champlain, North East and North West (LHINs 8, 9, 11, 13 and 14) is displayed, in order to show that some 













































Figure 4-12: Time-varying analysis comparison of non-CMCC graduates (reference group: CMCC) in 
Ontario between 2006 and all other years. 
 
Figure 4-13: Time-varying analysis comparison of female CCO registrants (reference group: Male) between 








School of Graduation (All Years vs 2006)























Figure 4-14: Map of Local Health Integration Networks (LHIN) in Ontario.
 
 




CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. Discussion of Findings 
 
 I conducted this study to investigate whether the Ontario government’s decision 
to delist chiropractic services coincided with changes to the practice status of CCO 
registrants. The results of my analysis pointed to a statistically significant change in 
status switches in the year 2006, when a greater number of CCO registrants chose to 
switch from Active to Inactive class. It was not possible to causally link delisting to the 
results of my analysis. However, the magnitude of registrants switching their status in 
2006 was greater than in any other year studied. My secondary aim was to establish 
which variables collected by the CCO might be predictive of the likelihood to switch to 
Inactive class. The survival analysis indicated that certain groups of registrants were 
more likely to make this switch than others during the time frame studied. However, the 
time-varying analysis indicated that following delisting, specifically in 2006, the contrast 
between those more and less likely to switch decreased. Instead, nearly all groups 
experienced an increase in risk of switching to Inactive class.  
5.1.1. Descriptive Data 
 
The results from analysis of frequencies and proportions showed that the 
demographic characteristics of the chiropractic profession were diversifying from 1996-
2007. Chiropractors who had registered with the CCO during the study time period were 
predominantly male, but the growth in female practitioners shifted the ratio of male-
female practitioners by roughly one point per year. In 1996, females accounted for 
382/1,934 of all Active registrants but grew to 1,071/3,554 by 2007. With the exception 
of the year 2006, the increase in annual number of male registrants was greater than 
that for female registrants. Female chiropractors began to make up 50% or more of 
registrants who graduated from 2005-2007. The ratio between domestically and foreign 
trained registrants moved closer to parity during this time frame. This rapid growth in 
registrants who trained abroad suggests Ontario was becoming an attractive location to 
practice. It was not possible to distinguish how many registrants were native Ontarians 
who chose to study abroad, and then returned home to practice. While I cannot conclude 
where registrants were born, it may be an important factor in explaining why Canadian-
trained graduates made up less than half of the chiropractic workforce in northwestern 
 
 




Ontario by 2007, and why the proportion of Canadian-trained chiropractors had also 
decreased in northeastern and southwestern Ontario. 
Descriptive analysis of the other two dependent variables, Years in Practice and 
Local Health Integration Network, provided further evidence of shifting trends and insight 
into changes in the profession. The frequencies for the variable Years in Practice 
revealed that there was a healthy flow of newly graduated practitioners into the health 
workforce from 1996-1998, but it was unsustainable. The 0-5 yrs subgroup grew by 
about 100 registrants per year for the first 3 years, until 1999 when growth nearly halted. 
The group’s rate of growth then appeared to recover but slowed and peaked in 2004, 
and then declined in the following years. While most other Years in Practice subgroups 
expanded, 16-20 yrs contracted, with fewer practitioners in 2007 than in 1996. The 
subgroup 21-25 yrs experienced a contraction after 2003, but began to expand again at 
the end of the time period. This supports speculation that a number of practitioners were 
seeking early retirement or switching careers. Finally, analysis of the variable LHIN 
showed an increase in registrants in suburban Toronto, most notably north of the city in 
Central and to the west in Mississauga Halton. Of the other areas which seem to have 
done well in the comparison given in Figure 4-4, Erie St. Clair and Central West were 
most prominent. In contrast, Toronto Central, which is an inner-city zone, proportionately 
contracted during the study period. The number of registrants in Northern Ontario grew 
at the slowest rates. There was also slow growth in South West, Central East and 
Hamilton Niagara. The slower growth in these areas may be related to practitioner 
oversaturation (Mior & Laporte, 2008), although the methodology I used was unable to 
definitively conclude this. The changes in proportion of practitioners by region may also 
have been related to the changes taking place in the proportion of the general population 
in each LHIN. Statistics Canada census data on population growth at large in the LHINs 
are comparable to the changes seen in practitioner populations (Statistics Canada, 
2006, 2009, 2017). 
5.1.2. Stickiness and Inflow 
 
 The results for Stickiness and Inflow suggest there was a particular year during 
1996-2007 where the year-year changes differed from the other years studied. The 
results for profession-wide Stickiness show an average fluctuation of 0.29 points from 
1997-2003, but then became erratic between 2004-2007, fluctuating at a year-year 
average of 2.42 points, or 8 times as much as previous years. Specifically, the 
 
 




profession became 4.14 points less sticky in the year 2006, when more registrants (217) 
switched to Inactive status than entered the workforce (205). Given the transition from a 
period of stability to instability occurred from 2004 onwards, these results suggest a 
relationship to the decision to delist chiropractic services from OHIP. Profession-wide 
Inflow results also showed a sudden change in the rate of registrants switching to 
Inactive, but the change occurred in 1999. In Figure 4-6, a 3.03 point difference was 
noted in indicator levels between 1998 and 1999. In the next data point, there was a 
2.12 point recovery, and small growth for the next two years. Finally, from 2003 until the 
end of the time frame, there was a gradual downward slope, with Inflow hitting its lowest 
point in 2006 at 6.54. A potential explanation for the observation in 1999 Inflow was the 
Ontario provincial government’s reduction to OHIP coverage of chiropractic services 
from $220 to $150 per Ontarian that year. 
 Stickiness and Inflow indicators also imply that there was an impact on the 
relative attractiveness of chiropractic in Ontario in the years 1999 and 2006 for the 
variables Sex and School of Graduation. Female registrant Stickiness averaged 1.3 
points lower than male registrants from 1996-2007 with the largest differences in the 
years 2000 (2.7 points) and 2007 (3.3 points). This highlights that female registrants 
were more prone to switching to Inactive status than were male registrants. The 
differences in Stickiness values between registrants with foreign training versus those 
with Canadian training showed an identical average of 1.3 points lower for non-Canadian 
graduates from 1996-2007. However, the largest differences were found in 1997 (4.8 
points) and 1999 (3.1 points). For Inflow, results for the variables Sex and School of 
Graduation demonstrated stronger practitioner growth in female registrants, as well as 
registrants with training outside of Canada. For the variable Sex, the average Inflow 
value for females from 1997-2003 was 13.41, nearly double the average value of males 
at 7.49. For School of Graduation, the 1997-2003 average Inflow value for non-CMCC 
graduates more than tripled that of CMCC graduates, at 21.74 versus 6.03. While the 
readout from Figure 4-6 does not evidence the same erratic behaviour at the second half 
of the time studied as for Stickiness, the average values for Inflow were markedly 
different from the first half, as decline set in. Average Inflow values dropped almost 3 
points for females, from 13.41 to 10.62, but the reduction in values was more drastic for 








 The results from the Stickiness and Inflow indicators for the chiropractic 
profession during the years 1996-2007 in Ontario allow for comparison to other health 
professions during this same period. Landry et al.’s study of physiotherapists examined 
these same indicators from 1999-2007, in Ontario (Landry et al., 2012). Their results 
show that there was an overall expansion of practitioners by 21%, from 5,003 to 6,064 
registrants. Assuming that Landry et al. reported on all registrants, and not just active 
ones, the rate of growth for physiotherapy was lower than in chiropractic, where the 
number of chiropractors scaled from 2,399 to 3,574 at a 49% expansion. Comparison of 
means for Inflow and Stickiness reveals that as a profession, chiropractic did not attract 
as many practitioners (7.9 versus 20.7), but it was much stickier (96.4 versus 81.4). 
Although Landry et al. did not report on years 2002- 2004, by the year 2004-5 Stickiness 
values had weakened for physiotherapists in Ontario, while at the same time, Inflow 
values had strengthened. While this is not entirely consistent with my observations for 
the chiropractic profession, the stability in Stickiness values from 1999-2002 compared 
to weaker values at the end of the time period is similar. Of the other studies in the 
literature assessing Stickiness and Inflow, Hastie’s work assesses occupational 
therapists in a similar time frame, from 1998-2006, with comparable analysis (Hastie, 
2009). The Stickiness and Inflow means for the overall profession indicate occupational 
therapy, like physiotherapy, was not as sticky a profession as chiropractic from 1998-
2006 (92.5 versus 96.5), but their workforce attracted more new practitioners (12.7 
versus 8.1). Stickiness and Inflow values for occupational therapists vary much more 
greatly than for chiropractors, which was most notable in a 12.9 point drop in Inflow from 
1998 to 1999, followed by a steep climb of 15.2 in the following year. This was offset by 
a peak in overall Stickiness in 1999. Similar studies looking at respiratory therapists, and 
nurses in long-term care and community care access centres only provide means as 
comparators (Alameddine et al., 2006; Gamble et al., 2011). Mean Stickiness and Inflow 
values for these groups are more similar to those provided by Landry et al. for 
physiotherapists (Landry et al., 2012). The comparison of different professional groups 
suggests that the relative attractiveness of the chiropractic profession had more in 









5.1.3.  Survival Analysis 
 
The results from the Cox Proportional Hazards analysis shed insight on how 
certain subgroups of CCO registrants acted during the study period. The results 
revealed that practitioners with the highest probability of leaving the profession during 
the study period were those beginning and ending their careers. The 0-5 yrs group was 
1.33 times more likely to cease practice, or move elsewhere (HR 1.33, CI 1.03-1.71). 
The > 30 yrs group were 2.03 times more likely to cease practice in Ontario (HR 2.03, CI 
1.48-2.77). It is not clear why practitioners in this group chose to leave practice at this 
rate, but given their proximity to retirement, potential explanations may differ compared 
to registrants listed under 0-5 yrs. The descriptive data exhibited 169 instances from 
1996-2007 where registrants switched to Retired status. The data suggested CCO 
registrants may not have switched the Retired status when retiring in the traditional 
sense – when they reached the age of 65, and decided to cease earning income from 
practicing for a living. Instead, the data reveal that of those making the switch for whom 
either date of birth or graduation date was available, 103 had not reached the age of 65, 
and one third of those were under the age of 40. The manner in which registrants retired 
may also have confounded the analysis, since in many cases, practitioners transitioned 
into Retired status, making use of Inactive status prior to a final switch to Retired status. 
Registrants making this sort of transition would have triggered inclusion into the group 
leaving practice before switching to Retirement status. In a few cases, practitioners in 
the 0-5 yrs group also switched to Retirement status, thus eliminating them from analysis 
instead of recording a switch to Inactive status. With respect to the number of retirement 
ready registrants who switched to Inactive instead of Retired status, the higher Hazard 
Rate Ratios for this group only served to highlight the difficulty that the 0-5 yrs group 
must have been experiencing as they attempted to start to practice in Ontario, giving an 
indication of how conditions may have been driving new registrants elsewhere. 
 For the results of the survival analysis for the LHINs, Table 4-5 reveals that areas 
highlighted by the descriptive data in Figure 4-4 as being most or least likely to 
experience growth also exhibited the highest Hazard Rate Ratios for switching to 
Inactive. For example, registrants practicing in the Central LHIN had one of the highest 
hazards of switching to Inactive (HR 1.36, CI 1.05-1.77), despite experiencing the most 
growth during the study period. In northern Ontario, growth was slowest in North East 
(HR 1.33, CI 0.93-1.92) and North West (HR 1.51, CI 0.93-2.45) LHINs. Champlain was 
 
 




the other LHIN where the probability of switching to Inactive was high (HR 1.33, CI 0.98-
1.81). Although it was not prominently featured in Figure 4-4, this LHIN is located on the 
border with Quebec, and ease of migration may have played a factor in the noted 
results. In contrast, registrants in Central West were least likely to switch to Inactive (HR 
0.42, CI 0.23-0.79), followed by Waterloo (HR 0.42, CI 0.23-0.79) and South West (HR 
0.42, CI 0.23-0.79). Interestingly, these LHINs all border one another. In the graph, 
these regions do not stand out particularly from others: population sizes were closer to 
the mean, as was their relative growth compared to other LHINs. Perhaps the lack of 
variability is responsible for the lower probabilities for switching to Inactive which were 
reported in this region during this period. Unfortunately, I did not have sufficient 
information to make larger inferences, such as whether there was a rural-urban divide in 
registrant status switches. 
Strong differences in probability of switching to Inactive status were also noted in 
the survival analysis according to Sex for the years 1996-2007. When looking at a 
Kaplan-Meier survival plot comparing male and female registrants, certain years in 
particular stand out. Female practitioners were 1.6 times more likely to cease practice 
during the study period (HR 1.60, CI 1.39-1.85). The survival estimate curves in Figure 
4-9 descend at roughly the same rate, with the exception of two pronounced differences: 
in the year 2000, the divide between the proportions of male and female practitioners 
switching to Inactive varied noticeably, and in 2006, registrants of both sexes apparently 
experienced a larger decline. However, for females, the decline was sustained for two 
years. These two points in time corresponded well with the outcomes from Figure 4-5 
and Figure 4-6. This may signify that there was an increased vulnerability to changing 
practice status by female practitioners during the study period. Another potential driver 
for switches from Active to Inactive classes concerns family-planning. Family-planning 
may serve as a confounding factor for drawing conclusions regarding the effect of 
delisting on registrant retention. Adamo has looked at the causes for female attrition in 
the highly educated workforce in Canada, but she questions the theories that “long 
hours, a heavy workload, high stress levels and motherhood” are barriers to recruitment 
and retention (Adamo, 2013). Instead, she argues that while women in medicine feel 
pressure in choosing between their profession and their families, it is not enough to drive 
them out of their professions. Adamo’s study investigated females pursuing careers in 
academia and medicine, and drew on earlier work using data from the 2000 Census 
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) in the US, comparing the fertility rates of female 
 
 




medical doctors, professors and lawyers to the general population (Wolfinger et al., 
2010). The conclusions reached by these studies do not speak directly to female 
chiropractors in Ontario, who may face other barriers particular to their practice model. 
Further work looking at female chiropractors in Ontario is necessary before a conclusion 
can be reached on whether family-planning was a confounder. 
 The results of the survival analysis for the variable School of Graduation, similar 
to the Stickiness and Inflow results, were comparable to Sex, with the exception of a 
sharper decline at the beginning of the time frame for the Non-CMCC group. Foreign 
graduate Stickiness outputs were weakest in 1997, with a larger drop in proportion to the 
total registrant sub-group. This corresponds to the Kaplan-Meier plot output for non-
CMCC graduates in Figure 4-8. The significance of this is mitigated when considering 
that only 14 Non-CMCC registrants switched to Inactive status in 1997, well below the 
average of 25 switches per year for this group over the period studied. The number of 
Non-CMCC graduates practicing in the province more than quadrupled from 188 to 896 
from 1996-2007, making the result from 1997 seem negligible in comparison to growth 
over the next few years, even though it came up as statistically significant in the 
analysis. As with Sex, the proportionally larger group, CMCC, switched to Inactive at a 
greater rate in 2006 compared to prior and subsequent years, and this effect is also 
seen in the Non-CMCC group. 
 The survival analysis sensitivity results did not vary greatly from the results 
discussed in this section, except in the case of Central LHIN. When comparing the 
results between the two analyses, the Hazard Rate Ratio for this area drops from 1.36 to 
1.14, and the probability that registrants located in Central would switch statuses is no 
longer statistically significant (compare p=0.02 to p=0.30). This substantial change in 
probability demonstrates that the sensitivity analysis was merited. It gives rise to 
speculation that inner city practitioners make use of the CCO exception to switch 
statuses temporarily more than their colleagues elsewhere. The reason for such a 
difference is not evident within the data analyzed. It should be noted that despite 
temporary switching being more prevalent in this region, the descriptive results still show 
a proportionate contraction in representation of CCO registrants from 1996 to 2007. 
Given the lack of substantial changes elsewhere between the survival analysis and the 
sensitivity, I maintain that the sensitivity remain an appendix to this work, and that 
discussion concerning it be limited. 
 
 




5.1.4. Time-Varying Analysis  
 
The previous discussion on survival analysis focussed primarily on the effects on 
sub-groups of registrants over the entire period studied, but review of the time-varying 
analysis shows how the behaviour of registrants changed in the year 2006 in particular. 
At the outset, the survival analysis conducted elucidated that certain groups, such as 
new and seasoned practitioners, females, and non-CMCC graduates were at greater 
overall risk of switching to Inactive status during the years 1996-2007. The time-varying 
analysis, however, shows that in the year 2006 there was a profession-wide effect, 
which temporarily altered the probability that particular registrants would switch to 
Inactive in Ontario. 
Figure 4-10 to Figure 4-13 show that in Ontario in the year 2006, the survival 
analysis outputs for many variable subgroups change drastically. Figure 4-10 shows that 
for Years in Practice, all groups experience an increase in the likelihood of switching to 
Inactive. This implies that the change experienced in that year, which coincided with 
delisting, unilaterally affected practitioners, however the group 21-25 yrs was less 
affected by the change compared to the others. Conversely, the Hazard Rate Ratios 
decreased for Non-CMCC (HR 1.08, CI 0.78-1.48) and female (HR 1.22, CI 0.90-1.67) 
groups. Finally, the Hazard Rate Ratios increased for registrants in the Central (HR 2.37, 
CI 1.34-4.20) and Central East (HR 1.91, CI 1.02-3.58) LHINs, and to a lesser extent, in 
the North East (HR 1.70, CI 0.75-3.89). On the other hand, the Hazard Rate Ratios for 
other LHINs decreased, such as Champlain (HR 1.24, CI 0.58-2.65) and North West (HR 
0.47, CI 0.06-3.55). The significance of the changes to Local Health Integration Network 
in the time-varying analysis is debatable, with each of the 14 regions experiencing 
changes in varying directions. However, where I set out to discover which groups were 
more prone by analyzing how the variables changed in 2006, I was surprised to discover 
that the significance between groups observed in all other years was in fact diminished. 
In a sense, all groups were affected, and not any one in particular. 
5.2. Strengths 
 
My study was well-equipped to explore the relative attractiveness of chiropractic 
in the province of Ontario around the time that a health policy decision was made directly 
concerning that profession, between the years 1996-2007. The data provided by the 
CCO captured all chiropractors practicing in good standing in this area, and available 
 
 




parameters allowed for robust statistical analysis. Since all practicing chiropractors in 
Ontario are required to register with the CCO, the sample population employed in this 
study was used to accurately describe these health professionals. The administrative 
data provided by the CCO allowed for an ecological investigation pre- to post-delisting. 
Additionally, following the Stickiness and Inflow analysis, the data was sufficient to allow 
me to narrow analysis down to one particular year, and compare it to all other years.  
5.3. Limitations 
 
My study also had limitations. Most chiropractic practitioners work in private 
practices (Canadian Institute of Health Information, 2017a). In conducting this 
investigation, I was unable to track switches from independent practice to other sectors, 
such as academic employment, public service, or practice management. An inquiry was 
made to the CCO regarding whether this information is known, and it was determined 
that during the time studied, the registration form did not capture employment sector. 
The lack of information on sectors limits the degree to which I was able to compare 
Stickiness and Inflow to other research looking at health professionals (Berta et al., 
2013; Gamble, 2002; Gamble et al., 2011; Landry et al., 2012; Miller, 2011). 
Another concern that arose during this study relates to the quality of the data 
collected from the regulatory body: the CCO. During the request for data from the CCO, I 
learned that examples of the registration forms from 1996 to 2007 were not held in their 
records. This did not come as a surprise, since very little guidance comes from the 
province on how records of registration ought to be kept. In 1991, the Regulated Health 
Professions Act was passed, including 21 professions at the time - and since then, 5 
more professions have been included under the Act ("Regulated Health Professions 
Act," 1991). The purpose of the Act was to provide a legislative framework for health 
regulatory colleges for each of these professions, who are charged with setting 
standards for practice, investigating complaints about members, and where necessary, 
disciplining them (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2009). Since regulatory status 
might be associated with legitimacy and good standing, as discussed in the case of 
homeopaths in Chapter 2, the costs involved in establishing these regulatory colleges 
have been shouldered by the professions with little complaint. With the onus of 
establishing regulatory bodies downloaded from provincial governments to the 
professions, the types of questions appearing on the registration forms may vary 
substantially from one college to another. Any line of research comparing regulatory 
 
 




body data, even when comparing the same profession in different provinces, is hindered 
by lack of standardization during collection. With the establishment of the Health 
Professions Database through Health Force Ontario in 2008, it has been hoped that 
progress will be made towards standardization. However, much work still needs to be 
done to ensure that regulatory body registration forms collect similar data to permit 
comparisons between professions with more ease. 
Ultimately, the methodology employed in this study is incapable of providing 
causal explanations for behaviours observed in the population studied. While I am 
confident that I can track changes that occurred in the health labour force in Ontario 
based on previous, normative behaviours, I cannot definitively conclude why those 
changes occurred. My results do distinguish that significant changes occurred, and 
further investigation into causal explanations for these changes is merited. 
5.4. Areas in Need of Further Research 
 
My thesis is a quantitative assessment of the retention of chiropractors in the 
province of Ontario, the intention of which was to monitor the relative attractiveness of 
their profession. While my analysis was able to detect significant changes in the relative 
attractiveness for certain years, further investigation into why these events occurred 
should be explored. For example, qualitative, structured interviews of stakeholders may 
provide insight on why changes in status occurred.  
There are other potential factors, in addition to those related to health policy 
decisions that might explain the migration and work behaviours of chiropractors in 
Ontario. For example, the descriptive data in Section 4.2.4 elucidates that the number of 
CCO registrants who had graduated from foreign institutions grew substantially during 
the time frame studied, but it does not explain what made the province so attractive to 
people in this group. Further investigations looking what drew graduates of international 
chiropractic programs to Ontario from 1996-2007 might help clarify these factors. These 
additional investigations might highlight whether conditions elsewhere in North America 
precipitated greater migrations of chiropractors towards Ontario, or whether more 
Ontarians were training to be chiropractors elsewhere, and then returning home. 
The methods used in this study may not be sufficient to conclusively determine 
that one set of circumstances was responsible to a greater degree for the behaviours 
exhibited by this particular health labour workforce. The results of this study may be 
 
 




used to compare future analyses of chiropractors. The results of this study may also be 
compared to labour analyses for other health professions. 
5.5. Implications 
 
My research was undertaken to explore the delisting of health services in 2004, 
to better understand the outcomes of that decision in order to guide future health policy, 
especially in the province of Ontario. This study examined the relationship between 
health policy changes which targeted chiropractors, and the potential effect that these 
decisions had on CCO registrants switching from Active to Inactive classes. In 2004, 
professions were targeted in the name of primary health care reform (Smitherman, 
2004). Chiropractors and physiotherapists are two professions whose services included 
coverage of care for MSK disorders. This disorder type is locally and internationally 
recognized as one of the most prominent and costly health concerns affecting 
populations of the world (Mustard et al., 2014; Prince et al., 2015). Furthermore, the 
prevalence of MSK disorders, including low back pain, increases with age, and the 
population of Ontario is aging (MacKay et al., 2010; Perruccio et al., 2006). However, in 
2004, Ontario’s government chose to decrease provincial insurance plan coverage of 
providers who specialize in care for MSK disorders. Following the decision to delist 
chiropractic services, my results show that a greater number of chiropractors switched 
from Active to Inactive classes. The profession-wide results from the Stickiness and 
Inflow analysis highlight that the years following both full and partial delisting decisions 
show distinct changes in those indicators, not found anywhere else in the time frame. 
Following 2004, there was greater attrition in the number of chiropractors serving Ontario 
at the same time that the government was attempting to increase the number of FHTs 
and other interdisciplinary health teams in the province. Romanow, in discussion of 
Recommendation 15 of his report, stated “If Canada is to move ahead on major reform 
to its health care system, the mix and skills of health care providers and how they work 
together must be addressed” (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada & 
Romanow, 2002). The government in Ontario appeared to address this recommendation 
with the establishment of FHTs and LHINs. Analysts have continued to assess the value 
that FHTs and the regionalization of health care into LHINs bring to the system, and how 
these initiatives can be improved to realize Romanow’s vision (Commission on the 
Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012; Harris et al., 2015; Hutchison et al., 2011; 
Marchildon & Hutchison, 2016). 
 
 




The outcomes of my research warn that health policy decisions targeting health 
professions may have unintended impacts on those professions, where the focus of 
these decisions ought to be on inclusivity instead. In the review of the literature 
conducted in Chapter 2, I applied the Ideas, Structure and Process theory developed by 
Doern and Phidd to recent health policy decisions in Ontario (Doern & Phidd, 1992). 
While this framework can be utilized to understand how health policy is practiced, I 
posited that feedback from the final, Process phase ought to inform the primary, Ideas 
phase in future decision-making. In this way, provincial governments in Ontario might 
use the framework of health policy in an iterative sense, where the outcomes of previous 
decisions guide future steps taken. Like the authors of the Drummond Report, I believe 
that the LHINs can play a key role in the administration of provincial healthcare 
(Commission on the Reform of Ontario's Public Services, 2012). One way which LHINs 
can exercise authority is through the oversight of the development of interdisciplinary 
teams, FHTs or otherwise. That oversight could include initiatives aimed at the 
recruitment and retention of health professionals who provide the best care within each 
of Ontario’s health regions. 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
My study was the first to monitor the relative attractiveness and retention of the 
chiropractic profession between the years 1996-2007 using Alameddine et al’s 
Stickiness and Inflow analysis (Alameddine et al., 2006). I used this analysis to 
determine whether a health policy decision made by the provincial government in 2004 
to delist health services impacted the chiropractors whose services were targeted. A 
profession-wide effect was observed in the year 2006, coinciding with the timeline 
following the implementation of the policy decision to delist chiropractic services. Certain 
sub-groups of the profession studied were at greater risk during the entire study period. 
However, following delisting, chiropractors appear to have been affected in a specific, 
profession-wide way. The duration of this effect is unclear. 
According to Minister Smitherman, the decision to delist health services in 2004 
was necessary to pave the way for primary health care reform (Aggarwal, 2009; 
Smitherman, 2004). In particular, it was necessary to make cuts to health services in 
Ontario to make funds available to implement a new, Family Health Team model under 
the Ontario Action Plan for Health. The results of my study suggest that health policy 
changes have intended consequences, such as stabilizing spending or off-loading care, 
 
 




but they also have unintended consequences. In this case, the unintended 
consequences may be linked to statistically significant decreases in the retention of 
existing chiropractors, as well as a disruption to the number of new practitioners 
attracted to the health workforce. 
  
   
 
 




Appendix A Cox Proportional Hazards Analysis Using Sensitivity Results 
 
 This section lists and briefly discusses the results of the sensitivity analysis 
conducted as a result of the discussion in Section 3.3.5.4. The sensitivity analysis was 
employed because I learned that the CCO allows registrants to switch from Active to 
Inactive, and then back to Active again, for up to five years. At five years, registrants 
may be asked to re-sit licensing examinations. Considering that those registrants using 
this exception were posing a potential confounder to my analysis, I conducted a 
sensitivity analysis to determine whether there were substantive changes in the results. 
Comparison between the original analysis and the sensitivity analysis reveals 
moderate differences. The most prominent difference between original and sensitivity 
data sets occurs in the results for the LHINs. The largest difference observed was in 
Central LHIN. The other areas where differences of moderate size were noted (HR 
change >0.1) were North East and North West, although it is possible that these 
changes were more drastic due to the smaller practitioner populations in these locales. 
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I highlight the differences between this analysis and the 
survival analysis where they were more prominent.  
 
Group Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
< 5 yrs 1.34 0.18 2.09 0.04 1.02 1.75 
6-10 yrs 0.88 0.14 -0.76 0.44 0.65 1.21 
16-20 yrs 0.81 0.15 -1.15 0.25 0.56 1.16 
21-25 yrs 0.66 0.14 -2.00 0.05 0.44 0.99 
26-30 yrs 1.19 0.24 0.89 0.38 0.81 1.77 
> 30 yrs 2.11 0.35 4.46 0.00 1.52 2.93 










Group Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Erie St. Clair 1.05 0.21 0.23 0.82 0.71 1.54 
South West 0.63 0.13 -2.23 0.03 0.42 0.94 
Waterloo Region 0.68 0.14 -1.83 0.07 0.45 1.03 
Central West 0.45 0.15 -2.46 0.01 0.24 0.85 
Mississauga Halton 0.94 0.16 -0.36 0.72 0.67 1.31 
Toronto Central 1.05 0.16 0.36 0.72 0.79 1.41 
Central 1.14 0.16 0.90 0.37 0.86 1.50 
Central East 1.15 0.17 0.92 0.36 0.85 1.55 
South East 0.61 0.18 -1.73 0.08 0.34 1.07 
Champlain 1.25 0.21 1.36 0.17 0.91 1.73 
North Simcoe Muskoka 0.93 0.20 -0.34 0.74 0.61 1.42 
North East 1.15 0.23 0.68 0.49 0.77 1.70 
North West 1.35 0.36 1.12 0.27 0.80 2.27 
Table A-2: Sensitivity Analysis results for Local Health Integration Networks 
 
Group Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-CMCC 1.37 0.11 3.86 0.00 1.17 1.61 




Table A-4: Sensitivity Analysis results for Sex 
Sex Haz. Ratio Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 











Appendix B Time-Varying Coefficient Analysis Tables 
Below are plots of the beta values, variance and covariance elements in order to compare the years 2006 and 1999 to all 
other years analyzed using Cox Proportional Hazards survival analysis. The first table may be used as a companion to the figures in 
Section 4.6.1.  
 




hrrAll [95% CI] hrr2006 [95% CI] 
Erie St. Clair 0.18 0.20 -1.36 0.78 -0.04 -1.18 0.57 0.75 1.19 0.80 1.77 0.31 0.07 1.34 
South West -0.48 0.22 0.74 0.45 -0.05 0.26 0.15 0.39 0.62 0.40 0.95 1.30 0.61 2.77 
Waterloo Region -0.31 0.22 -0.40 0.60 -0.05 -0.71 0.32 0.56 0.73 0.48 1.13 0.49 0.16 1.48 
Central West -0.85 0.35 -0.06 0.83 -0.12 -0.90 0.57 0.75 0.43 0.21 0.86 0.40 0.09 1.77 
Mississauga  0.00 0.18 -0.15 0.45 -0.03 -0.15 0.17 0.41 1.00 0.70 1.42 0.86 0.39 1.91 
Toronto Central 0.05 0.16 0.29 0.36 -0.02 0.34 0.11 0.33 1.05 0.77 1.42 1.41 0.74 2.68 
Central 0.13 0.15 0.73 0.33 -0.02 0.86 0.09 0.29 1.14 0.85 1.53 2.37 1.34 4.20 
Central East -0.01 0.17 0.66 0.36 -0.03 0.65 0.10 0.32 0.99 0.71 1.38 1.91 1.02 3.58 
South East -0.70 0.34 1.10 0.59 -0.11 0.39 0.23 0.48 0.49 0.26 0.96 1.48 0.58 3.82 
Champlain 0.30 0.17 -0.09 0.42 -0.03 0.22 0.15 0.39 1.36 0.97 1.89 1.24 0.58 2.65 
North Simcoe  -0.13 0.24 -0.02 0.57 -0.06 -0.16 0.27 0.52 0.87 0.55 1.40 0.86 0.31 2.36 
North East 0.23 0.21 0.30 0.47 -0.04 0.53 0.18 0.42 1.26 0.84 1.89 1.70 0.75 3.89 
North West 0.53 0.26 -1.29 1.06 -0.07 -0.76 1.07 1.03 1.70 1.03 2.82 0.47 0.06 3.55 
               
< 5 yrs 0.45 0.15 0.46 0.46 -0.02 0.90 0.19 0.43 1.56 1.16 2.11 2.47 1.06 5.74 
6-10 yrs 0.06 0.18 0.63 0.48 -0.03 0.69 0.20 0.45 1.06 0.75 1.50 1.99 0.83 4.76 
16-20 yrs 0.08 0.19 0.78 0.51 -0.04 0.86 0.22 0.47 1.08 0.75 1.58 2.37 0.95 5.93 
21-25 yrs -0.18 0.21 0.40 0.58 -0.05 0.21 0.29 0.54 0.83 0.55 1.27 1.24 0.43 3.57 
26-30 yrs 0.31 0.23 0.62 0.53 -0.05 0.93 0.23 0.48 1.36 0.87 2.12 2.53 0.98 6.52 
> 30 yrs 0.83 0.19 0.61 0.50 -0.03 1.44 0.22 0.47 2.28 1.59 3.29 4.22 1.68 10.56 
               
non-CMCC 0.35 0.09 -0.27 0.18 -0.01 0.07 0.03 0.16 1.41 1.19 1.68 1.08 0.78 1.48 
               
Female 0.55 0.08 -0.35 0.18 -0.01 0.20 0.02 0.16 1.73 1.47 2.04 1.22 0.90 1.67 
















hrrAll [95% CI] Hrr1999 [95% CI] 
Erie St. Clair 0.02 0.20 0.30 0.73 -0.04 0.31 0.50 0.71 1.02 0.69 1.50 1.37 0.34 5.46 
South West -0.32 0.20 0.12 0.73 -0.04 -0.20 0.50 0.71 0.73 0.49 1.07 0.82 0.20 3.26 
Waterloo Region -0.43 0.22 0.73 0.68 -0.05 0.29 0.42 0.65 0.65 0.42 0.99 1.34 0.38 4.76 
Central West -0.91 0.33 0.56 1.13 -0.11 -0.35 1.17 1.08 0.40 0.21 0.78 0.71 0.09 5.87 
Mississauga  -0.02 0.17 -0.50 0.83 -0.03 -0.52 0.67 0.82 0.98 0.70 1.38 0.60 0.12 2.95 
Toronto Central 0.14 0.14 -0.66 0.66 -0.02 -0.52 0.42 0.65 1.14 0.86 1.52 0.59 0.17 2.10 
Central 0.30 0.14 0.20 0.53 -0.02 0.50 0.26 0.51 1.35 1.03 1.76 1.64 0.61 4.44 
Central East 0.14 0.15 0.00 0.60 -0.02 0.14 0.33 0.58 1.15 0.85 1.55 1.15 0.37 3.57 
South East -0.48 0.29 0.69 0.87 -0.08 0.21 0.67 0.82 0.62 0.35 1.09 1.23 0.25 6.09 
Champlain 0.28 0.16 0.08 0.63 -0.03 0.36 0.37 0.61 1.33 0.97 1.82 1.43 0.44 4.70 
North Simcoe -0.16 0.22 0.26 0.85 -0.05 0.10 0.67 0.82 0.85 0.55 1.32 1.10 0.22 5.45 
North East 0.29 0.19 0.00 0.73 -0.04 0.28 0.50 0.71 1.33 0.91 1.94 1.33 0.33 5.31 
North West 0.37 0.26 0.52 0.86 -0.07 0.89 0.67 0.82 1.45 0.87 2.41 2.43 0.49 12.03 
               
< 5 yrs 0.53 0.15 0.55 0.44 -0.02 1.08 0.17 0.41 1.69 1.25 2.29 2.94 1.32 6.55 
6-10 yrs 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.52 -0.03 0.39 0.24 0.49 1.19 0.85 1.66 1.48 0.57 3.84 
16-20 yrs 0.28 0.18 -1.17 0.69 -0.03 -0.90 0.44 0.67 1.32 0.92 1.89 0.41 0.11 1.51 
21-25 yrs 0.13 0.21 0.17 0.64 -0.04 0.31 0.36 0.60 1.14 0.76 1.73 1.36 0.42 4.42 
26-30 yrs 0.45 0.21 -1.08 1.07 -0.04 -0.63 1.11 1.05 1.57 1.05 2.35 0.53 0.07 4.20 
> 30 yrs 0.96 0.18 0.73 0.59 -0.03 1.69 0.31 0.56 2.61 1.83 3.73 5.40 1.81 16.11 
               
non-CMCC 0.26 0.08 0.40 0.32 -0.01 0.66 0.10 0.31 1.30 1.11 1.52 1.94 1.05 3.56 
               
Female 0.49 0.08 -0.26 0.32 -0.01 0.23 0.10 0.31 1.63 1.40 1.89 1.25 0.68 2.31 
Table B-2: Time-varying analysis for the year 1999 compared to all other years. 
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Appendix C Consultation and Ethics Approval 
 
This proposal makes secondary use of data collected for purposes other than 
research. It has been approved by UOIT’s Research Ethics Board (file 13-126). With 
respect to the handling of the data, all appropriate precautions have been taken to 
ensure privacy and confidentiality of any personal, identifying information gathered by 
the investigator. Such measures included storing all physical data in a locked cabinet in 
a secured area, in the Office of Research Administration at the Canadian Memorial 
Chiropractic College, and employing encryption of electronic data on password protected 
files. Further, any information included in manuscripts will be presented in aggregate 
form, with particular care taken so as not to publish any features that would lead to the 
identification of any individual party about whom data has been collected. These 
measures include refraining from the analysis of areas containing groups of fewer than 5 
practitioners, such that they would be individually identifiable. This study will make use of 
data collected by Ontario’s chiropractic regulatory body, the College of Chiropractors of 
Ontario (CCO), for purposes of practitioners maintaining an active, practicing status 
within the province of Ontario. In 2014, the CCO agreed to share de-identified registrant 
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